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This Article explores and assesses the Russian discontinuance of 
intercountry adoptions to the United States. Part I describes the history 
of Russia-U.S. adoptions up to and including the 2012 adoption ban. 
Part II sets forth international laws and principles relevant to Russia’s 
adoption laws and practices. Part III assesses Russia’s ban on 
adoptions to America in light of domestic and international law and 
politics. It is argued that the Adoption Ban undoubtedly represents a 
largely politically-motivated response to the Magnitsky Act, and in this, 
it mirrors the politicization of intercountry adoption generally. Russia 
has the prerogative to strive to meet her children’s best interests 
domestically, without resorting to intercountry adoption – there is no 
duty to partake in intercountry adoption – but the American-targeted 
Adoption Ban is a disproportionate and cumbersome means of 
achieving this. This subordination of the best interests of the child to 
state-centric political considerations is problematic, in terms of the 
short-term interests of Russian children currently in need of families. 
The Article concludes with recommendations for Russia’s child welfare 
system moving forward. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Between 1995 and 2011, approximately 58,000 Russian children were 
adopted by American citizens.
1
 During this time, over seventy percent of 
Russian children adopted to families”
2
 outside of Russia were adopted by 
Americans.
3
 However on December 28, 2012, the movement of Russian 
infants and children to American families came to an abrupt halt, when 
the President of Russia signed a federal law “On Sanctions Against 
Persons Involved in Violations of Fundamental Human Rights and 
Freedoms of Citizens of the Russian Federation” [hereinafter Adoption 
Ban].
4
 Its measures include sanctions for “those guilty of violating the 
                                                     
1 Russian Adoption Statistics, BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 
http://adoption.state.gov/about_us/statistics.php (last visited Mar. 22, 2012) (listing statistics on 
Russian adoptions by year since 1999, totaling 45,112); Russian Adoption Statistics, 
ADOPTIONKNOWHOW.COM, http://www.adoptionknowhow.com/russia/statistics (last visited Mar. 
22, 2013) (showing the number of Russian adoptions to the U.S. from 1995 to 1998 totaling 12,657). 
2 Adoptive families are commonly called “forever families” in intercountry adoption circles, in 
reference to the permanent nature of adoption, as compared to transient institutional or foster care.  
See, e.g., Marlou Russell, Forever Families, ADOPTING.ORG, 
http://www.adoption.org/adoptions/forever-families-adoption-and-adoptive-parenting.html (last 
visited Mar. 25, 3013); Forever Family, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ADOPTION, 
http://encyclopedia.adoption.com/entry/forever-family/143/1.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2013). 
3 International Adoption Statistics: Russia, AUSTRALIAN INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION 
NETWORK, http://www.aican.org/statistics.php?region=0&type=birth (last visited Mar. 22, 2012) 
(showing the number of Russian children adopted by U.S. citizens as compared to other countries). 
4 O Merah Vozdeistviia na Lits, Prichastnyh k Narusheniiam 
Osnovopolagaiushchikh Prav i Svogod Cheloveka, Prav i Sbobod Grazhdan Rossiiskoi Federatsii [O
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fundamental human rights and freedoms” and those “who committed 
crimes against citizens of Russian Federation in a foreign country.”
5
 
Among other provisions, the law prohibits American citizens from 
adopting Russian children,
6
 thereby bringing to an end, at least for now, 
the longstanding and generally robust history of Russia-U.S. adoptions. 
The Russian law is known colloquially as the Dima Yakovlev Bill,
7
 
named for a 21-month-old Russian boy adopted to American parents in 
2008 and re-named Chase Harrison. Less than six months after his 
adoption, Chase died of hyperthermia after unintentionally being left in a 
car by his adoptive father.
8
 In a case that became highly politicized in 
Russia, Miles Harrison was acquitted of involuntary manslaughter by a 
Circuit Court judge in Fairfax County, Virginia, in December 2008.
9
 The 
Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs shortly thereafter issued a statement 
on the acquittal, expressing deep anger at the “flagrantly unjust ruling,” 
and implying a connection between Chase Harrison’s status as a Russian 




Thousands of Russian children have been welcomed into American 
families over the twenty years of Russia-U.S. adoption history.
11
 Of 
those children, Russia claims that twenty have been killed (whether 
                                                                                                                       
n Sanctions for Individuals Violating Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms of the Citizens of 
the Russian Federation], SOBRANIE ZAKONODATEL’STVA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [SZ RF] [Russian 
Federation Collection of Legislation] 2012, No. 272, Item F-3. 
5 Id. arts. 1.1(a), 1.1(b). 
6 Id. art. 4(1). 
7 Tim Ecott, Putin Signs Dima Yakovlev Bill, THE VOICE OF RUSSIA (Dec. 27, 2012), 
http://ruvr.co.uk/2012_12_27/Putin-says-he-will-sign-Dima-Yakovlev-Bill/ (last visited Mar. 25, 
2013). 
8 Ellen Barry, Russian Furor over U.S. Adoptions Follows American’s Acquittal in Boy’s 
Death, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Jan. 3, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/04/world/europe/04adopt.html?_r=0 (last visited Mar. 25, 2013). 
9 Id. (reporting on Judge Ney’s ruling that although Mr. Harrison’s actions were “plainly 
negligent”, “callous disregard for human life,” the legal standard for involuntary  manslaughter, had 
not been demonstrated). See, further, Marc Fisher, Why Was a Father Who Killed Son in Car 
Acquitted?, THE WASHINGTON POST (Dec. 19, 2008), 
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/rawfisher/2008/12/why_was_father_who_killed_son.html (citing 
the state prosecutor as saying “The fact that [Mr. Harrison] disregarded his duties when those 
circumstances are likely to cause injury or death, shows callous disregard.”). 
10 Russian MFA Information and Press Department Commentary on the Acquittal Handed 
Down by an American Court for Miles Harrison who had been Charged with Involuntary 
Manslaughter in the Death of his Russian Adoptee Dima Yakovlev, THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION (Dec. 18, 2008), 
http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/brp_4.nsf/e78a48070f128a7b43256999005bcbb3/a8cbc288c5d50da6c325
7527002206ae!OpenDocument (“Serious doubts arise as to the legitimacy of the practice of 
transferring our children for adoption to a country where their rights, primarily the right to life, turn 
out to be unprotected. And where adequate and … inevitable punishment is absent for those guilty of 
such tragedies on, apparently, the sole ground that they are full-fledged citizens, where their 
adoptees are not.”). 
11 Wm. Robert Johnston, Historical International Adoption Statistics, United States and World, 
JOHNSTONS ARCHIVE (May 20, 2012), http://www.johnstonsarchive.net/policy/adoptionstatsintl.html 
(showing the first adoption taking place in 1992). 
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intentionally or otherwise) by their American adoptive parents over the 
years, both prior to and following Chase Harrison’s death in 2008.
12
 In 
addition to deaths, a number of high-profile cases of abuse have also 
been reported in the Russian and U.S. media, leading to occasional 
temporary suspensions of Russia-U.S. adoptions,
 
and negotiations 
between sender (Russia) and receiver (U.S.) on how best to safeguard 
Russian adoptees without rendering an already cumbersome and costly 
process yet more cumbersome and costly.
13
 These negotiations 
culminated in a bilateral treaty on adoption (hereinafter Russian-
American Agreement),
14





 following approval given by Russia’s two parliamentary bodies 
and President Putin.
16
 The Russian-American Agreement addressed 
Russian concerns over failed adoptions by providing, inter alia, for 
parent screening and training,
17
 and mandatory post-adoption reporting to 
the Russian authorities.
18
 However, before there had been any 
opportunity to meaningfully gauge the success or otherwise of the 
bilateral treaty in these endeavors, the November 1
st
 Russian-American 






This dramatic turnaround should be considered in light of an 
intervening event. On December 14
th
 2012, the U.S. Congress passed the 
Magnitsky Act.
20
 The Adoption Ban, at first glance a policy response to 
                                                     
12 Russia Slams US Child Abuse ‘Double Standards’, RIA NOVOSTI (Dec. 13, 2012, 12:50 
PM), http://en.rian.ru/russia/20121213/178128109.html (citing Russia’s children ombudsman Pavel 
Astakhov); see also Russian Adoption Ban Not Linked to Magnitsky Act – Medvedev, RIA NOVOSTI 
(Jan. 27, 2013, 19:22 PM), http://en.rian.ru/russia/20130127/179061848.html. The number is twenty 
if the recent death of Max Shatto (infra, note 170 and accompanying text) is included in the count. 
13 See infra note 191 and accompanying text. 
14 Agreement Regarding Cooperation in Adoption of Children, U.S.-Russ., Jul. 13, 2011. 
15 United States – Russia Bilateral Adoption Agreement, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, (Oct. 18, 2012), 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/10/199322.htm. 
16 Notice: President Putin signs the Agreement between the United States of America and the 
Russian Federation Regarding Cooperation in Adoption of Children, INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION, 
BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP’T OF STAte, Jul. 31, 2012, available at 
http://adoption.state.gov/country_information/country_specific_alerts_notices.php?alert_notice_type
=notices&alert_notice_file=russia_7 (noting the procedure for the Agreement to enter into force);  
17 Russian-American Agreement, supra note 14, Art. 10(1)(b) (providing the steps prospective 
adoptive parents shall undergo before being deemed suitable and eligible to adopt). 
18 Id., art. 5(1)(a)-(b) (noting required post-adoption actions including monitoring of adoptee’s 
living conditions and upbringing, to be carried out by authorized agencies).  
19 The Russian-American Agreement provides that it is valid for one year after a party 
terminates it (art. 17(5)), however as discussed below, Russia has indicated that only adoptions 
court-approved prior to the ban would proceed (infra, note 28 and accompanying text). 
20 Russia and Moldova Jackson-Vanik Repeal and Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law 
Accountability Act of 2012, Pub. L. 112-208, 126 Stat. 1496 (hereinafter Magnitsky Act). See, e.g., 
Ecott, supra note 7 (stating that the bill is ‘widely seen inside and outside Russia as retaliation’ for 
the Magnitsky Act); Will Englund, Russians Say They’ll Name Their Magnitsky-retaliation Law 
After Baby who Died in a Hot Car in Va., THE WASHINGTON POST (Dec. 11, 2012), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2012/12/11/magnitsky-retaliation-man-baby/ 
(last visited Mar. 25, 2013) (referring to the Adoption Ban bill as retaliation for the Magnitsky Act). 
6/26/2013] Inter-country Adoption 5 
DRAFT—DO NOT CITE 
Russia-U.S. adoptions gone wrong, has also been dubbed the “Anti-
Magnitsky Law.”
21
 The Magnitsky Act repeals a Cold War trade sanction 
imposed on Russia in 1974; however this is coupled with the Sergei 
Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act. Sergei Magnitsky, an 
auditor working for an American firm in Moscow, accused Russian 
police and tax officials of involvement in a state-sanctioned $230 million 
tax fraud. He was subsequently arrested, and died in custody after being 
held for almost a year without trial, apparently having been tortured and 
beaten.
22
 The Magnitsky Act includes Congressional findings on Sergei 
Magnitsky’s death;
23
 references other unresolved murders, 
disappearances, torture cases and deaths in custody;
24
 professes the 
United States Government’s concern regarding the “deterioration of 
economic and political freedom inside Russia”;
25
 and  blacklists Russians 




Russia has denied a nexus between the Magnitsky Act and the 
Adoption Ban.
27
 The Russian Supreme Court has indicated that 
adoptions that had been court-approved prior to the New Year will be 
completed, notwithstanding the ban.
28
 Thousands of demonstrators have 
turned out for rallies in Russia, both in favor of and opposing the ban.
29
 
The Adoption Ban, the circumstances surrounding its enactment, and the 
                                                     
21 Yekaterina Kravtsova, Duma Stalls on Petition Opposing Anti-Magnitsky Law, THE 
MOSCOW TIMES (Jan. 15, 2013), http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/duma-stalls-on-
petition-opposing-anti-magnitsky-law/474002.html (referring to the Adoption Ban as the “Anti-
Magnitsky Law”). 
22 Kathy Lally & Will Englund, Russia Fumes as U.S. Senate Passes Magnitsky Law Aimed at 
Human Rights, THE WASHINGTON POST (Dec. 6, 2012), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/us-passes-magnitsky-bill-aimed-at-
russia/2012/12/06/262a5bba-3fd5-11e2-bca3-aadc9b7e29c5_story.html. 
23 Magnitsky Act, supra note 20, § 402(a)(7-12). 
24 Id. § 402(a)(15). 
25 Id. § 402(b) 
26 Id. § 404, 405. 
27 Maria Young, Adoption Ban: Children Russia’s Top Priority, Says Envoy, RIA NOVOSTI 
(Feb. 14, 2013, 08:00 AM), http://en.rian.ru/russia/20130214/179458523.html (citing Ambassador 
Sergei Kslyak stating that the ban was not a reaction to the Magnitsky Act); Russian Adoption Ban 
Not Linked to Magnitsky Act – Medvedev, supra note 12 (citing Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev as 
saying that the Adoption Ban is “neither in fact nor in law” linked to the Magnitsky Act). 
28 Alert: Russian Supreme Court Letter on Implementation of Federal Law No. 272-FZ, 




29 Sonia Elks & Steve Gutterman, Russian Demonstrators Rally in Support of U.S. Adoption 
Ban, REUTERS, (Mar. 2, 2013, 10:02 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/02/us-russia-
adoption-idUSBRE92107D20130302 (reporting on a 12,000-strong pro-ban rally in March 2013, 
and a ‘tens of thousands’ march protesting the ban, in January 2013). See, further, Most of Russian 
Cabinet Against U.S. Adoption Ban – Deputy PM, RUSSIAN LEGAL INFORMATION AGENCY, Mar. 20, 
2013, http://rapsinews.com/legislation_news/20130320/266774715.html (referring to pro- and anti-
ban marches, and citing the Deputy Prime Minister’s assertion that the majority of Russian ministers 
are against the Adoption Ban). 
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subsequent impassioned debate about Russia-U.S. adoptions past, present 
and future, is the most recent illustrative example of the intersection of 
intercountry adoption law and practice with politics. 
This Article explores and assesses the Russian discontinuance of 
intercountry adoptions to the United States. Part I describes the history of 
Russia-U.S. adoptions up to and including the 2012 adoption ban. Part II 
sets forth international laws and principles relevant to Russia’s adoption 
laws and practices. Part III assesses Russia’s ban on adoptions to 
America in light of domestic and international law and politics. It is 
argued that the Adoption Ban undoubtedly represents a largely 
politically-motivated response to the Magnitsky Act, and in this, it 
mirrors the politicization of intercountry adoption generally. Russia has 
the prerogative to strive to meet her children’s best interests 
domestically, without resorting to intercountry adoption – there is no 
duty to partake in intercountry adoption – but the American-targeted 
Adoption Ban is a disproportionate and cumbersome means of achieving 
this. This subordination of the best interests of the child to state-centric 
political considerations is problematic, in terms of the short-term 
interests of Russian children currently in need of families. The Article 
concludes with recommendations for Russia’s child welfare system 
moving forward. 
 
I. THE HISTORY: THE UNITED STATES, RUSSIA AND INTERCOUNTRY 
ADOPTION 
Part I introduces Russia-U.S. intercountry adoption. Specifically, Part 
I.A traces the history of intercountry adoption generally and the 
evolution of the driving forces and motives behind its expansion. Part I.B 
describes Russia’s changing role as a sending country in the intercountry 
adoption picture, including domestic policy debates and examples of 
politicized failed adoptions, such as that of Chase Harrison. Part I.C 
focuses on the December 2012 ban, and the accompanying domestic 
policy measures aimed at improving in-country care for Russian orphans. 
 
A. The History and Motives of Intercountry Adoption 
 1. The “Child-Rescue” Approach 
The United States is the largest receiver of intercountry adoptees,
30
 with 
9,319 such adoptions in 2011,
31
 and has historically always been so.
32
 
                                                     
30 Publications on Convention of 29 May 1993 on Protection of Children and cooperation in 
Respect of Intercountry Adoption, Country Statistics, HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/adop2010pd05_us.pdf  (last visited Mar. 20, 
2013). 
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Intercountry adoption
33
 is not a new phenomenon, however the rhetoric 
surrounding its functions and objectives has shifted throughout its 
evolution. The earliest manifestation of intercountry adoption was as a 
humanitarian “child rescue” effort – for example, in the late 19
th
 century, 
the practice arose of sending abandoned or neglected children from the 
UK to the British colonies.
34
 Many of these early international adoptees 
were seen as needing to be rescued from the stigma of illegitimacy.
35
 
Around the same time, a parallel child rescue movement, focused on 
child poverty, was taking place in America. Concerned by the numbers 
of vagrant or impoverished children in New York, many of whom were 
the children of newly-arrived immigrants, the New York Children’s Aid 
Society organized the controversial “orphan train movement.”
36
 Between 
100,000 and 200,000 children were put on trains between 1854 and 
1929; heading West, the trains would stop at more than 45 states, 
locating placement families for these “children of unhappy fortune.”
37
 As 
a forerunner to the foster care system, the orphan trains were to some a 
means of furthering the interests of unfortunate children, and to others a 
source of cheap labor.
38
  
 Modern intercountry adoption, “signifying the movement of children 
from institutional care in impoverished or conflict ravaged countries into 
the middle-class homes of adopters in western societies,”
39
 is generally 
traced to the end of World War II
40
 and, shortly thereafter, the Korean 
War.
41
 The “child rescue” mindset has continued to permeate 
                                                                                                                       
31 Intercountry Adoption, Bureau of Consular Affairs, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 
http://adoption.state.gov/about_us/statistics.php (last visited Mar. 20, 2013). 
32 Johnston, supra note 11 (Intercountry Adoptions by Receiving Countries, 1970-2011). 
33 Also known as international adoption or transnational adoption. The terms are used 
interchangeably herein. 
34 KERRY O’HALLORAN, THE POLITICS OF ADOPTION: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON 
LAW, POLICY & PRACTICE 132 (2009). 
35 See, generally, MIKE MILOTTE, BANISHED BABIES: THE SECRET HISTORY OF IRELAND’S 
BABY EXPORT BUSINESS (1997) (on children born to unmarried young women in secret Catholic 
charity homes, and then sent to the U.S., often without the mother’s approval). See, also, Julia 
Gillard Apologies to Australian Mothers for Forced Adoptions, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 20, 2013, 
21:28 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/mar/21/julia-gillard-apologises-forced-adoptions 
(noting the Australian Prime Minister’s recent national apology to unwed mothers forced by the 
government to give up their babies for adoption between World War II and the 1970s). 
36 Orphan Trains, THE ADOPTION HISTORY PROJECT, 
http://darkwing.uoregon.edu/~adoption/topics/orphan.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2013). 
37 The Orphan Trains Program Transcript, PUBLIC BROADCASTING SERVICE, 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/orphan/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2013). 
38 Id. 
39 O’HALLORAN, supra note 34, 132. 
40 Id, at 132.  
41 JEAN NELSON ERICHSEN, INSIDE THE ADOPTION AGENCY 6 (2007) (relating the story of the 
first North American international adoption agency, established in response to the institutionalization 
of Ameri-asian children in Korean orphanages following the Korean War). For a discussion of the 
qualitative differences between the adoption of European children following World War II, and the 
American response to Korean War orphans, see Kathleen Ja Sook Bergquist, International Asian 
Adoption: In the Best Interest of the Child?, 10 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 343, 346 (2003-2004). 
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intercountry adoption to date, from “Operation Baby-lift” at the 
conclusion of the Vietnam War,
42
 to heightened interest in adoption 
following high-profile exposes on conditions in foreign orphanages.
43
 
More recently, since the 1990s increasing numbers of evangelical church 
organizations have advocated intercountry adoption as a faith-based 




 2. A “Market” for Children? Parent-driven Objectives 
The rhetoric of “child rescue” remains prevalent in modern intercountry 
adoption, however over time a number of parent-driven or family-driven 
objectives and arguments in favor of the practice have also emerged.
45
 
Where the initial primary concern of modern international adoption was 
to provide permanent families for children orphaned by conflict,
46
 
adoption is increasingly seen as a mutually beneficial means of providing 
childless parent/s (whether due to infertility, or an inability or 
unwillingness to adopt domestically) with children. Thus while there are 
many older and special needs children in need of family care within 
receiving countries, including the U.S.,
47
 intercountry adoption has 
                                                     
42 Agency for International Development, Operation Babylift Report, 1975, THE ADOPTION 
HISTORY PROJECT, http://pages.uoregon.edu/adoption/archive/AIDOBR.htm (citing a Washington 
Report on the acceleration of inter-country adoption processing of Vietnamese children due to the 
emergency war situation). In some cases, adopted children were subsequently returned to their birth-
parents, after it emerged they had not in fact been relinquished: ERICHSEN, supra note 41, 55. 
43 CHRISTINE ADAMEC AND LAURIE MILLER, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ADOPTION 166 (2007) 
(referring to documentaries on orphanage conditions in Romania in the late 20th century); see, 
further, Steven Mosher, The Dying Rooms: Chinese Orphanages Adopt a “Zero Population Growth 
Policy”, 6 POPULATION RESEARCH INSTITUTE REV. 1 (1996). 
44 See James 1:27 (THE BIBLE, NEW INTERNATIONAL VERSION): “Religion that God our Father 
accepts as pure and faultless is this: to look after orphans…in their distress…”. See, e.g., 
Shaohannah’s Hope (http://www.showhope.org/AboutUs/WhoWeAre.aspx) (a non-profit 
organization founded in 2003 by Christian singer-songwriter Steven Curtis Chapman, that provides 
financial aid to prospective adoptive parents). See, further, KATHRYN JOYCE, THE CHILD CATCHERS: 
RESCUE, TRAFFICKING, AND THE NEW GOSPEL OF ADOPTION xii 2013 (“Across the United States a 
much wider spectrum of evangelical churches … had begun to view adoption as a perfect storm of a 
cause: a way for conservative churches to get involved in poverty and social justice issues that they 
had ceded years before to liberal denominations, an extension of pro-life politics and a decisive 
rebuttal to the taunt that Christians should adopt all those extra children they want women to have, 
and, more quietly, as a window for evangelizing, as Christians get to “bring the mission field home” 
and pass on the gospel to a new population of children, effectively saving them twice.”). 
45 See Ruth-Arlene W. Howe, Adoption Laws and Practices in 2000: Serving Whose Interests?, 
33 FAM. L. Q. 677, 680 (1999-2000) (discussing a corresponding paradigm shift in domestic U.S. 
adoptions, in which the “traditional child welfare agency focus” is often eclipsed by “efforts to 
satisfy the desires of adults who wish to parent”). 
46 O’HALLORAN, supra note 34, 133. 
47 See, generally, Madelyn Freundlich, The Future of Adoption for Children in Foster Care: 
Demographics in a Changing Socio-Political Environment, THE EVAN B. DONALDSON ADOPTION 
INSTITUTE (1998), http://www.adoptioninstitute.org/policy/polfos.html (estimating that 15-20% of 
children in U.S. foster care need families through adoption); Jeanne Howard & Stephanie Berzin, 
Never Too Old: Achieving Permanency and Sustaining Connections for Older Youth in Foster Care, 
THE EVAN B. DONALDSON ADOPTION INSTITUTE (2011), 
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received increased attention in recent decades as a means of acquiring a 
younger as opposed to older child; and as an alternative to domestic 
adoption for individuals or couples whose prospects of adopting in the 
U.S. are limited due to age, marital status, race or sexual orientation.
48
 
Kathleen Ja Sook Bergquist argues that another parent-focused need that 
has historically underpinned international adoption is the “pseudo-
altruistic need to make a social statement about participation in and 
responsibility to crossing racial boundaries” in a society (the U.S.) trying 
to redress historic racism.
49
 More pragmatically, Alison Fleisher lists a 
number of parent-centric advantages to intercountry adoption over 
domestic adoption, including avoiding the rights of birth mothers and 
biological fathers, and avoiding disclosure requirements.
50
 
 The steady increase of international adoption in recent decades is 
frequently explained by reference to the decreased “availability” of 
adoptable infants and children in developed countries due to 
contraception, abortion and the reduced stigmatization of out-of-wedlock 
parents.
51
 A “market” for children has emerged, in which countries with 
high birthrates and many children in need of care tend to become sending 
countries, and countries with low birthrates and small numbers of such 
children becoming receiving countries.
52
 On the “supply” side of the 
market, there are a multitude of factors behind the high numbers of 
children in institutional care, and eligible for adoption,
53
 in sending 
                                                                                                                       
http://www.adoptioninstitute.org/publications/2011_07_21_NeverTooOld.pdf, 27 (noting that age is 
the strongest predictor of whether an adoptable child in the foster system will achieve it). See, 
further, Erika Lynn Kleiman, Caring for our Own: Why American Adoption Law and Policy Must 
Change, 30 COLUM. J. L. & SOC. PROBS. 327, 334 (1997). 
48 Elizabeth Bartholet, International Adoption: Propriety, Prospects and Pragmatics, 13 AM. 
ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAW 181 (1995-1996) (hereinafter Bartholet, Propriety), 182 (noting the 
shortage of babies available for adoption domestically, and the use of international adoption for 
singles and over-40 couples who may not be able to adopt in the U.S.); Elizabeth Bartholet, Where 
do Black Children Belong? The Politics of Race Matching in Adoption, 139  U. OF  PENN. L. R. 1163 
(1991) (describing historic in-racial adoption placement preferences in the U.S., following 
opposition in the 1970s from the National Association of Black Social Workers and Native 
American leaders to transracial domestic adoptions, leading to low availability of adoptable infants 
and children for Caucasian parents); Alison Fleisher, The Decline of Domestic Adoption: 
Intercountry Adoption as a Response to Local Adoption Laws and Proposals to Foster Domestic 
Adoption, 13 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 171, 189 (2003-2004) (discussing intercountry 
adoption as a means of avoiding America’s stringent adopter criteria); JOSEPHINE RUGGIERO, 
EASTERN EUROPEAN ADOPTION: POLICIES, PRACTICE, AND STRATEGIES FOR CHANGE 21-22 (2007) 
(noting the attraction of intercountry adoption to single, elderly and same-sex couples, and the 
relative speed of international adoptions as compared to domestic adoption). 
49 Bergquist, supra note 41, 346-7; see, further, Shani King, Challenging Monohumanism: An 
Argument for Changing the Way We Think about Intercountry Adoption, 30 MICH. J. INT’L LAW. 
413, 424 (2009) (postulating that a “reaction against the inhumanity of racist and divisive ideology” 
may be a related motivating factor). 
50 Fleisher, supra note 48, 190-191. 
51 Bartholet, Propriety, supra note 48, 181. 
52 Id. (noting that the “world divides into essentially two camps for adoption purposes”). 
53 The question of whether an adoptee is, in fact, a “true” orphan or foundling is complicated 
by the evidence put forward by opponents of intercountry adoption (at least in its current form) that 
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countries. These include poverty;
54
 insufficient welfare/health-care 
support for parents, particularly of special-needs children;
55
 political 
ideology relating to birth rates;
56
 and local cultural norms on adoption.
57
 
 Parent- or family-driven objectives (to be a parent or to establish 
a family) do not, of course, necessarily exclude a co-existing child-driven 
objective of providing a loving home to a child otherwise going 
without;
58
 however at times the discourse surrounding adoption comes 
uncomfortably close to casting adoptees as objects or commodities rather 
than subjects,
59
 something frequently pointed out by opponents of 
intercountry adoption.
60
 The development of a “market-place” is evident 
at the adoption agency selection stage of intercountry adoption, when 
prospective parents must choose from among hundreds of registered 
                                                                                                                       
the “market” for international adoptees is itself contributing to the number of apparent adoptees 
available in sending countries, due to the incentivization of baby stealing practices: see, generally, 
David Smolin, Child Laundering: How the Intercountry Adoption System Legitimizes and 
Incentivizes the Practice of Buying, Trafficking, Kidnapping and Stealing Children, 52 WAYNE L. 
REV. 113 (2006) (hereinafter Smolin, Child Laundering) (discussed infra). 
54 See O’HALLORAN, supra note 34, 137 (using the experience of Korea to illustrate the 
significance of poverty on the availability of adoptees).  
55 See, e.g., Kay Johnson et al., Infant Abandonment and Adoption in China, 24(3) 
POPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT REV. 469 (1998), at 504 (noting the financial burden on parents of 
children with disabilities as a cause behind abandonment in China due, in part, to lack of state 
support). 
56 See, e.g., KAY JOHNSON, WANTING A DAUGHTER, NEEDING A SON 57 (2004) (citing a local 
Chinese government report explicitly acknowledging the connection between abandonment and the 
one child policy campaign); O’HALLORAN, supra note 34, at 137 (reporting a nexus between the 
Romanian Ceauseacu regime’s policy that families have a minimum of four children each, and 
abandonment of Romanian children due to an inability to provide for them). 
57 See,e.g., Bong Joo Lee, Adoption in Korea: Current Status and Future Prospects, 16 INT. J. 
OF SOC. WELFARE 75, 76 (2007) (noting the Confucian emphasis on blood-ties and associated 
stigma with adoption historically evident in Korea). C.f. Johnson et al., supra note 55, at 483 (noting 
that some strains of Confucianism support adoption outside bloodlines to build kinship). 
58 O’HALLORAN, supra note 34, at 135 (noting that the supply/demand nature of adoption does 
not detract from the compassionate, altruistic motives of prospective adopters). 
59 Bergquist, supra note 41, at 346 (“Motivation for adoption had shifted from the altruistic, 
finding a home for a parentless child, to the supply and demand economics of finding children for 
childless couples.”); Andrew Bainham, International Adoption from Romania – Why the 
Moratorium Should Not be Ended, `15 CHILD & FAM. L. Q. 223, 226 (2003) (“Under [Romania’s 
1990’s international adoption] regime children were treated as commodities in breach of all 
international obligations.”). See, e.g., frequent references to the “supply” of children from sending 
countries as an obvious solution to the high “demand” for [desirable] adoptable children in receiving 
countries: Bridget Hubing, International Child Adoptions: Who Should Decide What is in the Best 
Interests of the Family?, NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 655, 659 (2001) (“Here, the 
greatest desire is for healthy, white children; however, the number of preferred children available in 
the United States does not meet this demand”); Rachel Wechsler, Giving Every Child a Chance: The 
Need for Reform and Infrastructure in Intercountry Adoption Policy, 22 PACE INT’L L. REV. 1, 6 
(2010) (“Currently in the U.S., the demand for healthy infants to adopt outstrips the supply”); 
Margaret Liu, International Adoptions: An Overview, 8 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L. J. 187, 190 (1994) 
(referring to the “imbalance of supply and demand for “healthy white babies” in the United States”).  
60 King, supra note 49, at 448. See, also, Sara Dillon, Making Legal Regimes for Intercountry 
Adoption Reflect Human Rights Principles: Transforming the United Nations Convention on the 
Rights of the Child with the Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption, B. U. INT’L L. J. 179, 254 
(noting that “many of the evils attributed to intercountry adopters alone – i.e., seeking a young infant 
to resemble the adoptive parents – may also be characteristic of in-country adoptive parents.”). 
6/26/2013] Inter-country Adoption 11 
DRAFT—DO NOT CITE 





 3. Best Interests – of the Child, of the Sender 
The other facet of the “supply/demand” model of intercountry adoption 
is the assertion sometimes made that the practice is a rational, burden-
relieving solution for sending countries that find themselves 
overwhelmed in their care of “orphaned”, institutionalized children.
62
 
Apart from the fact that this rather naively assumes that the market for 
adoptees does not itself contribute to an increase in the “baby supply” in 
sending countries,
63
 the counter-assertion is that intercountry adoption, 
rather than beneficial for sending countries, is inherently neocolonialist, 
or, in other words, a modern form of imperialism. Intercountry adoption 
invariably involves the movement of children from under-resourced birth 
parents and birth countries, to comparatively well-off Western families in 
the first world, which Bergquist argues is strikingly neocolonial.
64
 To 
others, this movement of children represents the exploitation of “unjust 
social structures in the sending countries” for the benefit of receivers.
65
 
Through this lens, intercountry adoptions are characterized as an 
“exercise of influence and control by the more powerful nations who are 
seen as ‘robbing’ Third World countries of their children whilst 
confirming their inferiority and inadequacy ….”
66
  
In response to “imperialist” objections, adoption advocates argue 
that ethically and legally the paramount issue is whether international 
                                                     
61 See, e.g., ERICHSEN, supra note 41, 16 (noting the visual aids such as “banners … of 
beautiful babies” used by adoption agencies at adoption fairs to attract potential clients). 
62 Colin Joseph Troy, Members Only: The Need for Reform in U.S. Intercountry Adoption 
Policy, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1525, 1528 (2011-2012) (arguing that intercountry adoption is 
mutually beneficial as the “poverty burden” of sending countries are thereby reduced); Lindsay K. 
Carlberg, The Agreement Between the United States and Vietnam Regarding Cooperation on the 
Adoption of Children: A More Effective and Efficient Solution to the Implementation of the Hague 
Convention on Intercountry Adoption or Just Another Road to Nowhere Paved with Good 
Intentions?, 17 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 119, 125 (2007) (referring to the post-war burden of 
poverty partially lessened by intercountry adoption between 1953 and 1981). 
63 See, generally, Smolin, Child Laundering, supra note 53 (discussing the incentivization of 
stealing, kidnapping and buying children by the demand of the intercountry adoption market). 
64 Bergquist, supra note 41, at 349. 
65 Leslie Doty Hollingsworth, International Adoption among Families in the United States: 
Considerations of Social Justice, 48 SOC. WORK 209, 209 (2003). 
66 John Triseliotis, Intercountry Adoption: In Whose Best Interest?, in INTER-COUNTRY 
ADOPTION: PRACTICAL EXPERIENCES 119, 131 (Michael Humphrey & Heather Humphrey eds., 
1993), cited in Curtis Kleem, Airplane Trips and Organ Banks: Random Events and the Hague 
Convention on Intercountry Adoptions, 28 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 319, 325-6 (1999-2000). C.f. 
Saralee Kane, The Movement of Children for International Adoption: An Epidemiologic Perspective, 
30 THE SOC. SCI. J. 4, 313 (1993) (arguing that the movement of children via international adoption 
“is not significantly affecting the human resources of most countries of origin”). 
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adoption serves the best interests of potential adoptees,
67
 regardless of 
the “neo-colonialist hue”
68
 that the exchange may entail. The “best 
interests” principle, found, inter alia, in the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child,
69
 the Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption,
70
 and 
bilateral adoption treaties, provides that the best interests of the child 
shall be the primary concern in all decisions, actions and procedures 
relating to intercountry adoption. An assumption evident in much pro-
adoption scholarship is that the “best interests” card self-evidently and 
invariably requires family care, the pursuit of which trumps concerns 
relating to imperialism and the related issue of the removal of children 
from their culture.
71
 As David Smolin eloquently puts it, “[f]rom this 
perspective, ethical or political objections to intercountry adoption lack 
legitimacy, since they sacrifice the concrete good of children to 
ideological idols.”
72
 This may often be the case (although “best interests” 
is necessarily an individualized enquiry),
73
 but the imperialist argument 
also sheds light on a related issue of concern in international adoption. 
Frequently in humanitarian, child-centered discourse on adoption, the 
“best interests” standard masks an underlying ideological inconsistency – 
are we saving children from being family-less/institutionalized, or saving 
them from third-world countries?
74
 The latter is rarely espoused publicly, 
                                                     
67 See, e.g., Bartholet, Propriety, supra note 48, at 184 (arguing that controversies such as the 
imperialism issue have little to do with the “best interests” of children, despite the supposed 
paramountcy thereof). 
68 King, supra note 49, 425. 
69 Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. GAOR, 44 Sess., U.N. Doc. 
A/44/49 (1989), Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3, entered into force Sept. 2, 1990 [hereinafter 
UNCRC], art. 3 (“In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social 
welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests 
of the child shall be a primary consideration); art. 21 (“State Parties that recognize and/or permit the 
system of adoption shall ensure that the best interests of the child shall be the paramount 
consideration…”). 
70 Hague Convention on Private International Law: Final Act of the 17th Session, Including the 
Convention on Protection of Children and Co-Operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption, May 
29, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1134 (entered into force May 1, 1994),[hereinafter Hague Convention], art. 4(b) 
(providing for adoption to be in the best interests of the child). 
71 See, e.g., Wechsler, supra note 59, at 15 (“In contrast to opponents of intercountry adoption, 
supporters prioritize the children…” (internal quotation omitted)). 
72 David Smolin, Intercountry Adoption as Child Trafficking, 39 VAL. U. L. REV. 281, 283 
(2004). 
73 O’HALLORAN gives the example of two (unrelated) Romanian girls, who were subject to 
international adoption orders but issued proceedings in the Romanian District Court to have the 
orders revoked as they did not want to leave their native country: supra note 34, 162. 
74 See, e.g., King, supra note 49, at 423 (referring to past motives in intercountry adoption of 
saving children from third-world countries); and at 439-40 (“Invariably, legal scholars describe the 
opportunities for adoptive children as improved in the United States, and in doing so, imply the 
superiority of upper- and middle-class parents to poor birth parents. Scholars routinely explain that 
intercountry adoption offers hope to children of improving their life chances, often of escaping a life 
“marred by poverty””…). 
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lying, as it does, “perilously close to controversial notions of cultural or 
national superiority,”
75
 but is not absent from adoption rhetoric.
76
 
The “best interests” standard is frequently employed on both 
sides of the intercountry adoption debate. Intercountry adoption –
assuming an ideal system that “only includes adoption of those children 
who would have been in the system (without the family of origin) in any 
event,”
77
 i.e. does not contribute to baby stealing practices
78
 – is 
commonly seen as serving a child’s best interests by removing her from 





 On the other hand, critics argue that 
intercountry adoption, contrary to their best interests, unnecessarily 
denies adoptees their cultural identity and a “sense of group heritage.”
81
 
A softer cultural argument is that intercountry adoption in some cases 
unnecessarily under-privileges a child’s right to culture, because in-
country care in non-Western family-style social networks is too readily 
dismissed in favor of out-of-country care.
82
 A related concern is the 
monetization of adoptions, and the oft-overlooked fact that the 
“humanitarian” intercountry adoption effort spends tens of thousands of 
dollars per adoptee “to divide families that could have been kept intact 
for a hundred dollars or less.”
83
 
                                                     
75 Smolin, Child Laundering, supra note 53, at 116. 
76 See, e.g., David Herszenhorn & Erik Eckholm, Putin Signs Bill that Bars U.S. Adoptions, 
Upending Families, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Dec. 27, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/28/world/europe/putin-to-sign-ban-on-us-adoptions-of-russian-
children.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (referring to criticism that the Adoption Ban will deny Russian 
children a better standard of living). 
77 Dillon, supra note 60, at 187 and 189 (2003). Dillon refers to the difficulty of identifying 
those children with certainty as the “adoptability conundrum” (at 187). 
78 See, generally, Smolin, Child Laundering, supra note 53. 
79 See, e.g., Dillon, supra note 60, 186-7 (2003). 
80 Bartholet, Propriety, supra note 48, at 185 (arguing that the law should afford children “the 
right to grow up in a nurturing environment”; see, further, Dillon, supra note 60, at notes 201-202 
(discussing the harms of long-term institutionalization). 
81 Bartholet, Propriety, supra note 48, at 202 (noting the culture argument, but arguing that 
international adoption is an “extraordinarily positive option for the homeless children of the world, 
compared to all other realistic options”). See, also, Linda J. Olsen, Live or Let Die: Could 
Intercountry Adoption Make the Difference?, 22 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 483, 510 (2003-2004) 
(noting that “there is little argument from adoption proponents that it is important for intercountry 
adoptive families to affirm a child’s culture and heritage”). 
82 King, supra note 49, at 466-469 (discussing “non-traditional” caregiving in non-Western 
countries, and the need to ensure that the intercountry adoption system is not “removing children 
from what they would describe as family”). 
83 Smolin, Child Laundering, supra note 53, at 188; “It is ethically questionable to spend 
thousands of dollars (or tens of thousands of dollars) to arrange an intercountry adoption, when aid 
of less than a thousand dollars would have kept the child with their birth family”  (at 127). See, 
further, Bainham, supra note 59, at 226 (referring to “orphans” from Romania whose “birth parents 
and families all too obviously existed but lacked the resources to remain involved.”); JOHN 
TRISELIOTIS ET AL., ADOPTION THEORY, POLICY AND PRACTICE 181 (1997) (“The legitimacy of in-
country or intercountry adoption will continue to be questioned until such time as adequate income 
maintenance schemes and preventative type services are developed to provide real choice for all 
birth parents”). 
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Other common arguments against international adoption are less 
individualized, and seem to focus more on the best interests of children 
(generally) as opposed to specific cases. For example, some 
commentators express concern that the ready supply of foreign adoptive 
parents may discourage in-country initiatives aimed at reducing 
abandonment and keeping birth families intact.
84
 Jena Martin 
characterizes this as a pessimistic view of adoption, which does not 
necessarily deny the current value of the practice, but sees it as a short-
term solution which should complement a long-term aim of rendering 
international adoption obsolete.
85
 She contrasts this to a more optimistic 
view of adoption, which subscribes to the win/win theory as far as ideal 
adoption goes, but acknowledges the abuses that an imperfect adoption 
system commonly entails.
86
 Those abuses are well documented by David 
Smolin, who argues that the adoption system, at least as it exists in very 
poor sending countries, “both legitimizes and incentivizes stealing, 
kidnaping, trafficking and buying children,”
87
 thereby “reduc[ing] the 
humanitarian rationale for intercountry adoption into a cruel façade….”
88
 
It is, of course, overly reductionist to describe the debate over 
intercountry adoption as one of “for or against,” as most commentators 
concede both the potential merits of the practice in at least some 
circumstances, and the undeniable need for reform to move closer to the 
ideal of corruption-free, child-focused adoption. The complexity of the 
debate is reflected in the differing prioritizations of out-of-country care 
vis-à-vis in-country options, evident in commentary and international 
legal instruments relevant to child welfare. The first adoption-specific 
UN Declaration, for example, embodies a preference for domestic foster 
(temporary) or, indeed, other “suitable” domestic placements, over 
foreign (permanent) adoptions.
89
 The 1989 UN Convention on the Rights 
                                                     
84 See Bergquist, supra note 41, at 349-50 (arguing that international adoption may allow 
sending countries to “abdicate responsibility for enacting sociopolitical change to secure the well-
being of all children…”.; Jonathan Dickens, The Paradox of Inter-country Adoption: Analysing 
Romania’s Experience as a Sending Country, 11 INT’L J. SOC. WELFARE 76, 83\2 (2002) (“as long 
as the door of inter-country adoption remains open, there are powerful organizational and personal 
reasons to use it, and these logics decrease the chances of urgent and concert efforts being made to 
develop in-country alternatives”.). C.f. Bartholet, Propriety, supra note 48, at 198 (arguing that such 
efforts are “not inconsistent with supporting foreign adoption”, and that foreign adoption may in fact 
increase awareness within sending countries of the need to address child welfare problems).  
85 Jena Martin, The Good, the Bad & the Ugly? A New Way of Looking at the Intercountry 
Adoption Debate, 13 U. C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 173, 188 (2006-2007).  
86 Id., at 187-8. 
87 Smolin, Child Laundering, supra note 53, at 115. 
88 Id., at 116. See, further, Dillon, supra note 60, at 188 (acknowledging that the “profitability 
of intercountry adoption has probably tended in some jurisdictions to bring children into the system 
who would not otherwise have been there”). 
89 Declaration of Social and Legal Principles Relating to the Protection and Welfare of 
Children, with Special Reference to Foster Placement and Adoption Nationally and Internationally, 
G.A. Res. 41/85, Annex, U.N. Doc. A/RES/41/85/Annex (Dec. 3, 1986) (hereinafter Declaration of 
Social and Legal Principles), art. 17. 
6/26/2013] Inter-country Adoption 15 
DRAFT—DO NOT CITE 
of the Child takes the same approach, in effect casting international 
adoption as a measure of last resort.
90
 UNICEF embraces three principles 
to guide adoption decisions – first, that family-based solutions are 
preferable to residential placements; secondly, that permanent solutions 
are preferable to temporary ones; and thirdly, that domestic solutions are 
preferable to international solutions.
91
 Because intercountry adoption 
cannot fulfill the third condition, UNICEF views it as “subsidiary” to 
“any foreseeable solution that corresponds to all three.”
92
 The 1993 
Hague Convention,
93
 a multilateral treaty designed to regulate 
intercountry adoption, is somewhat more “pro-adoption,”
94
 although, as a 
political necessity,
95
 is ultimately also deferential to the views of national 
governments as to the merits or otherwise of intercountry adoption over 




B. Russia as a “Sending Country” 
 1. Post-U.S.S.R. Growth 
While modern international adoptions date to World War II and the 
Korean War, adoptions from Eastern European countries to America 
developed more recently.
97
 Prior to its fall in 1991, the Soviet Union was 
not a significant participant in international adoptions.
98
 In the years 
following the Soviet Union dissolution, Americans began to adopt 
Russian children in increasing numbers, with 695 adoptions in 1993 
leading to a peak of 5878 adoptions a decade later.
99
 By 1995, China and 
Russia had taken over from Colombia and Korea as the top countries 
sending adoptees to the U.S.
100
 Russia has consistently ranked in the top 
                                                     
90 UNCRC, supra note 69, art. 21(b). 
91 Guidance Note on Intercountry Adoption in the CEE/CIS Baltics Region, UNICEF (Sep. 
2009), http://www.unicef.org/ceecis/UNICEF_ICA_CEE_Guidance_WEB.pdf, at 4. 
92 Id., at 4. 
93 Supra note 70. 
94 Richard Carlson, The Emerging Law of Intercountry Adoptions: An Analysis of the Hague 
Conference on Intercountry Adoption, 30 TULSA L. J. 243, 255 (1994) (“A common criticism in the 
U.S. is that the Convention is not bold enough in encouraging intercountry adoption. However, to 
say that the Convention merely tilts in favor of intercountry adoption is to understate the importance 
of the Convention’s gains.”). See, further, infra at notes 240 - 248 and accompanying text. 
95 Id., at 262-4 (discussing the drafting negotiations over whether to move away from the 
U.N.’s prior stance on intercountry adoption). 
96 Dillon, supra note 77, at 215 (“The Hague Convention leaves a good deal of discretion in the 
hands of national bureaucracies, and does not clearly address the human rights implications of 
institutionalization.”). 
97 RUGGIERO, supra note 48, at 3. 
98 Id., at 5 (noting that two U.S.S.R. children were adopted to America between 1957 and 1963, 
and an absence of adoptees from the Soviet Union to the U.S. until 1991); Johnston, supra note 11 
(showing the first adoption from Russia taking place in 1992). 
99 Id., at 5 (noting annual adoptions from Russia to the U.S. between 1993 and 2005). 
100 HEATHER JACOBSON, CULTURE KEEPING: WHITE MOTHERS, INTERNATIONAL ADOPTION, 
AND THE NEGOTIATION OF FAMILY DIFFERENCE 22 (2008); International Adoption Facts, China and 
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three sending countries since then.
101
 Of the Russian children adopted 
internationally between 1995 and 2012, over 70% have been received by 
American families.
102
 A marked contrast between Russian adoptees and 
adoptees from other sending countries is their age – between 1993 and 
2005, 52% of Russian adoptees to the U.S. were between one and four 
years old, and 21% were five years old or older.
103
 
 The increased attention to intercountry adoption generally in the 
1970s and 1980s has already been noted.
104
  Similarly, Russia came to be 
viewed as an attractive sending country for adoptive parents in the 1990s 
for a variety of reasons. Like many sending countries, Russia had 
relatively relaxed adoption policies at the outset of its intercountry 
adoption program, as compared to the U.S. In addition to shorter 
processing times,
105
 looser eligibility criteria meant that unmarried 
persons, same-sex couples
106
 and over-60 couples, ineligible to adopt in 
the U.S., were often successful in adopting from Russia.
107
 
 Dr. Josephine Ruggiero points to two other factors behind the 
increase in Russian intercountry adoptions in the 1990s – racial 
congruity;
108
 and international concerns over child welfare in post-Soviet 
Eastern Europe.
109
 Racial preference is commonly cited as a factor 
                                                                                                                       
Russia have Replaced South Korea as the Primary Countries from which U.S. Citizens Adopt, EVAN 
B. DONALDSON ADOPTION INST., http://www.adoptioninstitute.org/FactOverview/international.html 
(last visited Apr. 1, 2013) (providing a comparison of top sending countries in 1990 and 2001). 
101Johnston, supra note 11 (table of adoptions to the U.S. by sending region/country, 1991-
2011); see, further,  Top Countries of Origin for U.S. International Adoptions, 2001-2006, 
INFOPLEASE, http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0881281.html (last accessed Apr. 1, 2013) (showing 
top five sending countries from 2001 – 2006). 
102 International Adoption Statistics: Russian Federation, AUSTRALIAN INTERCOUNTRY 
ADOPTION NETWORK, http://www.aican.org/statistics.php?region=0&type=birth (last visited Apr. 1, 
2013) (showing the number of Russian children adopted by U.S. citizens as compared to all other 
receiving countries). 
103 RUGGIERO, supra note 48, at 10-11 (also noting that the majority of adoptees from China 
and Korea were under the age of one). 
104 Supra, at note 51 and accompanying text. Russia, like many sending countries, had 
relatively relaxed adoption policies at the outset of its intercountry adoption program, as compared 
to the U.S. In addition to shorter processing times, looser eligibility criteria meant that unmarried 
persons, same-sex couples and over-60s couples, ineligible to adopt in the U.S., were often 
successful in adopting from Russia (id. at 21-22). 
105 JACOBSON, supra note 100, at 39-40, cited in Cheryl Allen, The US-Russian Child Adoption 
Agreement: An End to Failed Adoptions?, 35 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1690, 1700 (2011-2012) (noting 
that Russian paperwork processing and adoption procedure times were fairly quick during the early 
1990s). C.f. Mary Hora, A Standard of Service that All Families Deserve: The Transformation of 
Intercountry Adoption between the United States and the Russian Federation, 40 BRANDEIS L. J. 
1017, 1021 (2001-2002) (discussing the difficulties of Russian adoptions due to corruption and 
“nationalistic rhetoric”). 
106 C.f. Putin Orders Ban on Adoptions by Foreign Same-Sex Couples, RT.COM (Mar. 28, 
2013, 09:53 AM), http://rt.com/politics/gay-couples-report-foreign-973/ (reporting that Russia plans 
to prohibit inter-country adoption to same-sex couples in response to France’s approval of same-sex 
couple adopters in February 2012).  
107 RUGGIERO, supra note 48, at 21-22. 
108 Id., at 22 (referring to Russia as a “pipeline to Caucasian children”). 
109 Id. at 22 (noting wide publicity of the plight of children in Eastern European orphanages). 
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drawing prospective adoptive parents to Russia,
110
 due to the posited 
preference of adoptive parents for white infants.
111
 Of course, the top 
sending countries to the U.S. have historically been notably “other” in 
terms of ethnicity.
112
 However, racial congruity is arguably a factor 
behind both the choice to pursue international, as opposed to domestic, 
adoption,
113
 and the choice of sending country.
114
  To the extent that 
racial congruity does factor into adoptive parents’ choice of sending 
country, some commentators have expressed concern that a child’s 
accessibility to intercountry adoption is at least partially determined by 
his or her race.
115
  
The aforementioned considerations are somewhat parent-centric, 
although not exclusively so (an altruistic drive to adopt may lead parents 
to prioritize efficient programs, and racial congruity is seen by some as 
an aspect of ensuring a child’s best interests).
116
 Another main factor 
                                                     
110 See, e.g., Hora, supra note 105, at 1021 (noting that “some white Americans have turned to 
Russia because they prefer to adopt a child that physically resembles them”); Laura McKinney, 
International Adoption and the Hague Convention: Does Implementation of the Convention Protect 
the Best Interests of Children?, 6 WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 361, 374 (2007) (referring to 
the desire of some prospective adoptive parents to adopt “children whose physical characteristics 
resemble the family’s racial and cultural background”). 
111 Twila Perry, Transracial and International Adoption: Mothers, Hierarchy, Race, and 
Feminist Legal Theory, 10 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 101, 137 (1998) (stating that “white infants” are 
the “most sought after children for adoption”). The racial preference aspect of intercountry adoption 
is related to the arguable commodification of potential adoptees (discussed supra note 59 and 
accompanying text) and feeds into a broader debate on the merits or otherwise of interracial adoption 
both domestically and internationally – the seminal work is by Elizabeth Bartholet: Where do Black 
Children Belong? The Politics of Race Matching in Adoption, supra note 48.  
112 Johnston, supra note 11 (table of adoptions to the U.S. by sending region/country, 1991-
2011) (China, South Korea, Guatemala and Ethiopia are among the top five sending countries to the 
U.S. for the 1991-2011 period). 
113 Solangel Maldonado, Discouraging Racial Preferences in Adoptions, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 1415, 1418 (2005-2006) (“Another reason many Americans opt to adopt internationally [is] 
race. Although the majority of children available for international adoption are not white, they are 
not Black either.”); HAWLEY GRACE FOGG-DAVIS, THE ETHICS OF TRANSRACIAL ADOPTION 12 
(2002) (“The reality is that adoption is a last resort for most, and that very few whites want to adopt 
black children. Most whites prefer healthy white infants, and when they discover that such babies are 
in short supply they are more likely to adopt children of Colombian, Korean and American Indian 
ancestry than to adopt African American children.”). 
114 Maldonado, supra note 113, at 1415 (“The racial hierarchy in the adoption market places 
white children at the top, African American children at the bottom, and children of other races in 
between, thereby rendering Asian or Latin American children more desirable to adoptive parents 
than African American children.”); Bartholet, Race Matching, supra note 48, at 1167 (“Racial 
thinking dominates the world of international adoption”).  See, further, Peter Selman, Trends in 
Intercountry Adoption: Analysis of Data from 20 Receiving Countries, 1998-2004, 23(2) J. OF 
POPULATION RESEARCH 183 (2006) (noting that until the 1990s, the number of children adopted 
from African countries was very low”); but c.f. HOWARD ALTSTEIN & RITA SIMON, INTERCOUNTRY 
ADOPTION: A MULTINATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 3 (1991) (noting that African countries have generally 
not approved of intercountry adoption of their children). 
115 O’HALLORAN, supra note 34, at 159. 
116 See, e.g., Bartholet, Where do Black Children Belong?, supra note 48 (citing a 1972 
statement by the National Association of Black Social Workers to transracial adoption: “Black 
children belong, physically, psychologically, and culturally in Black families in order that they 
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behind Russia’s appeal as a sending country, concern over child welfare, 
is more obviously humanitarian. Since the fall of the Iron Curtain, 
relinquishment has been a significant social problem in Russia,
117
 with 
over 100,000 children entering the State orphanage system annually 
since 1996.
118
 Stories and images of neglected and abused children in 
overcrowded Russian orphanages became commonplace in the Western 
media,
119
 at a time when increasing numbers of Americans were looking 
to adopt internationally.  
 
 2. Russian Voices on Children without Families 
The problem of children without parental care is a significant challenge 
for the Russian Federation. There were over 700,000 such children in 
Russia as of 2009,
120
 an estimated 2.79% of the total child population.
121
 
Children without parental care are often designated orphans (especially 
in adoption discourse), but it is estimated that between 80% and 95% are 
“social orphans”, meaning they have at least one living parent who has 
                                                                                                                       
receive the total sense of themselves and develop a sound projection of their future”); see, further, 
Fleisher, supra note 48, at 179-180. 
117 See, generally, CLEMENTINE K. FUJIMURA ET AL., RUSSIA’S ABANDONED CHILDREN: AN 
INTIMATE UNDERSTANDING (2005). 
118 Allen, supra note 105, at 1701, citing FUJIMURA ET AL., id.  See, further, infra, notes 120 to 
130 and accompanying text. By way of comparison, around 250,000 children enter the U.S. foster 
care system annually, of which more than half remain in the system (Meet the Children, ADOPT U.S. 
KIDS, http:// http://www.adoptuskids.org/meet-the-children (last accessed Jun. 6, 2013)). Fifteen 
percent of children in U.S. foster care live in institutions and group homes (Facts about Foster Care, 
CHILDREN’S RIGHTS, http://childrensrights.org/issues-resources/foster-care/facts-about-foster-care/ 
(last accessed Jun. 6, 2013)). 
119 RUGGIERO, supra note 48, at 22 (referring to “stark images” in the media of abandoned 
children and the “bleak, institutional settings” in which many were growing up). See, e.g., Kathleen 
Hunt, Abandoned to the State: Cruelty and Neglect in Russian Orphanages, HUMAN RIGHTS 
WATCH, Dec. 1998, available at http://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/reports98/russia2/; Melissa 
Akin, New Study Lists Abuses in Russia’s Orphanages, THE MOSCOW TIMES (Dec. 17, 1998), 
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/new-study-lists-abuses-in-russias-
orphanages/282152.html; Mareike Aden, U.S. Couple Battles Russian Adoption Ban, DEUTSCHE 
WELLE (Feb. 18, 2013), http://www.dw.de/us-couple-battles-russian-adoption-ban/a-16596137 
(“The biggest wave of adoption took place during the 1990s, when pictures of starving children in 
overcrowded Russian orphanages shocked people in the West.”). 
120 UNICEF Annual Report for Russian Federation 2010, UNICEF, 
http://www.unicef.org/about/annualreport/files/Russian_Federation_COAR_2010.pdf, (hereinafter 
UNICEF 2010 Report), at 2 (referring to the 130,000 children who live in Russian state institutions 
as 18% of the population of children without parental care); see, further, What’s the Matter Here? – 
Russian Orphans & American Adoption, THE ACCIDENTAL RUSSOPHILE (Mar. 2, 2006), 
http://accidentalrussophile.blogspot.com/2006/03/whats-matter-here-russian-orphans.html 
(estimating the number of orphans in Russia in 2005 as 700,000). The number may be conservative, 
as it fails to take into account homeless children living on the streets: Situation Analysis of Children 
in the Russian Federation 2007, UNICEF, http://www.unicef.org/sitan/files/ru_en_situation-
analysis_170907.pdf (hereinafter UNICEF 2007 Report), at 71-72 (noting the difficulty of 
ascertaining the precise number of street children, but citing Ministry of Interior statistics that in 
2004, around 90,000 children had either left home or were missing). 
121 UNICEF 2010 Report, supra note 120. 
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voluntarily or involuntarily relinquished them to the state.
122
 A number 
of factors account for this, including economic hardship associated with 




 and a lack of state 
support particularly for parents of children with disabilities.
125
 Further, 
Russia’s guardianship system is “mainly punitive”, more focused on 
deprivation of parental rights than assisting parents to keep or regain 
custody of their children.
126
 Although the annual number of children 
deprived of parental care is declining,
127
 a significant number of children 
are removed from their parents by court order due to abuse or neglect 
annually, and only a small number of such children are returned to their 
parents within a year of removal.
128
  
                                                     
122 Max Fisher, The Real Reason Russia wants to Ban Adoptions by ‘Dangerous’ American 
Families, THE WASHINGTON POST (Dec. 28, 2012)  (stating that 80% of Russian orphans are “social 
orphans”); Statistical Snapshots: Russia’s Children at Risk, RUSSIAN CHILDREN’S WELFARE 
SOCIETY, http://www.rcws.org/aboutus_statistics.htm (citing UNICEF’s estimate that 95% of 
Russian “orphans” are “social orphans, meaning that they have at least one living parent who has 
given them up to the state”); Michael Schwirtz, An Experiment in Orphan Care in Russia, THE NEW 
YORK TIMES (Oct. 1, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/01/world/europe/01iht-
russia.4.16620179.html?pagewanted=all&_r=2& (stating that the majority of classified orphans in 
Russia have been “abandoned or taken from parents because of neglect or abuse”). 
123 David Smolin, Child Laundering and the Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption: The 
Future and Past of Intercountry Adoption, 48 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 441, 467 (2009-2010) 
(hereinafter Smolin, The Future and Past of Intercountry Adoption) (noting that the economic 
collapse which followed the fall of communism “aggravated” the problem of abandonment); 
UNICEF 2007 Report, supra note 120, at 70; see, further, President Vladimir Putin, Annual Address 
to the Federal Assembly (May 10, 2006, Marble Hall, the Kremlin, Moscow), available at 
http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2006/05/10/1823_type70029type82912_105566.shtml (last 
accessed Apr. 4, 2013) (noting the ongoing difficulties faced by families in feeding their children). 
124 UNICEF 2007 Report, supra note 120, at 78 (noting references to alcohol abuse as a 
significant factor behind abandonment in studies of the issue); Kate Pickert, Russian Kids in 
America: When the Adopted Can’t Adapt, TIME MAGAZINE (Jun. 28, 2010), available at 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1997439-1,00.html (noting that Russian orphans 
are more likely to have fetal alcohol syndrome than orphans from other sending countries). 
125 UNICEF 2007 report, supra note 120, at 78 (noting the “ease with which a mother may 
abandon at birth” and the lack of economic support for parents of children with disabilities or special 
medical needs); Smolin, The Future and Past of Intercountry Adoption, supra note 123, at 467 
(noting the significant incidence of abandonment of disabled children). 
126 Svetlana Smetanina, Protecting Russia’s Orphans, RUSSIA BEYOND THE HEADLINES (Apr. 
13, 2011), http://rbth.ru/articles/2011/04/13/protecting_russias_orphans_12692.html (noting the 
punitive nature of the Russian guardianship system, as contrasted with a regional approach in 
Tyumen, Russia, which is more “positive” – “Most importantly, there is no talk of depriving these 
parents of their parental rights and putting their children in orphanages.”); see, further, Boris 
Altshuler, Russia and the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, RIGHT OF CHILD (Regional 
NGO for Protection of Children’s Rights), Oct. 6 2010, available at 
http://pravorebenka.narod.ru/eng/ (arguing that preventive systems are not developed in Russia). 
127 Boris Altshuler, Russian NGOs’ “Alternative Report – 2013” to the Committee on the 
Rights of the Child, Apr. 3, 2013, available at http://pravorebenka.narod.ru/eng/, at 12 (noting a 
decline from 127,000 in 2006 to 83,000 in 2012). See, further, Family Code of the Russian 
Federation, SOBRANIE ZAKONODATEL’STVA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [SZ RF] [Russian Federation 
Collection of Legislation] 1996, No. 11, Item 939 (hereinafter Russian Family Code), art. 69 
(providing that children can be removed from their parents if, inter alia, the parents suffer from 
chronic alcoholism or drug addiction); UNICEF 2007 Report, supra note 120, at 79-80 (calling for a 
reduction in judicial termination of parental rights). 
128 Id. (noting a figure of less than 10%). 
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Faced with very large numbers of children needing state care, 
Russia traditionally prioritized institutional care over foster care;
129
 
domestic adoption was likewise underdeveloped.
130
 However in the 200s, 
partly in response to criticism in the 1990s of the quality of care in its 
institutions,
131
 domestic Russian policy began to increasingly 
acknowledge the problem of social abandonment,
132
 and to accept and 
promote domestic foster care and adoption programs as alternatives to 
institutionalization.
133
 For example, federal programs were put in place 
providing financial incentives for foster parents,
134
 and the Russian 
Family Code was amended to expressly enshrine a preference for family-
style care (such as adoption and foster care) over institutionalization.
135
 
Today, the majority of Russia’s designated orphans are cared for in 
family settings,
136
 but there are still a large number – 100,000 as of 
                                                     
129 Smolin, The Future and Past of Intercountry Adoption, supra note 123, at 466 (noting the 
government’s failure to “develop appropriate alternatives, such as foster care or other family-based 
care, for children who could not remain with their families”); UNICEF 2007 Report, supra note 120, 
at 79 (referring to the “paradigm of [the Russian] child welfare system” as involving a “relatively 
large network of institutions for childcare and long-term residence”). 
130 Smolin, The Future and Past of Intercountry Adoption, supra note 123., at 466; see, further, 
Vladimir Putin’s 2006 Address to the Federal Assembly, supra note 123 (calling for increased 
domestic adoptions); Boris Altshuler, Russian Domestic Adoption:  Hopes for Future Development, 
RIGHT OF CHILD (Oct. 2002), available at http://pravorebenka.narod.ru/eng/index.htm (arguing that 
the Russian government has not effectively advocated family placement of orphans over 
institutionalization). 
131 See, e.g., Hunt, supra note 119 (a widely publicized 1998 Human Rights Watch report on 
the conditions in Russian orphanages); Russian Orphanages Struggle amid Economic Crisis, CNN 
(Dec. 28, 1998), 
http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/europe/9812/28/russia.orphans/index.html?_s=PM:WORLD.  
132 UNICEF 2007 Report, supra note 120, at 70 (noting the government’s 2002 pledge to fight 
the “social abandonment of children” and related policy measures). 
133 UNICEF 2007 Report, supra note 120, at 80-81. See, e.g., Vladimir Putin’s 2006 Address to the 
Federal Assembly, supra note 123 (calling for financial incentives for placing orphans in “family 
care”); Excerpts from Transcript of Meeting with the Cabinet, February 5, 2007, PRESIDENT OF 
RUSSIA OFFICIAL WEBSITE, 
http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/text/speeches/2007/02/05/1855_type82913type82917_117804.shtml 
(last accessed Apr. 2, 2013) (noting the 2007 federal “Children and the Family” program aiming 
(inter alia) to “increase the number of orphaned children living in families rather than in state 
children’s homes”); Vladimir Putin, Speech at the Opening Ceremony for the Year of the Family in 
Russia, Dec. 24, 2008, The Kremlin, Moscow, available at 
http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/text/speeches/2007/12/24/1039_type82912type84779_155422.shtml 
(referring to legislation aimed at improving the foster care and guardianship process, and stating that 
the state cannot replace the family);  Life in the Orphanage, RUSSIAN ORPHANAGE OPPORTUNITY 
FUND (Nov. 14, 2011), http://www.roofnet.org/orphanage_life (last accessed Apr. 2, 2013) (noting 
that adoption and foster care system initiatives are “steadily gaining acceptance in Russia”); 
Schwirtz, supra note 122 (reporting on an experimental orphan community near Moscow, 
established as a “model of reform” for Russia’s institution-focused welfare system);. 
134 UNICEF 2007 Report, supra note 120, at 81 (noting increased financial support for foster 
families following President Putin’s 2006 call for enhanced aid for children without parents). See, 
generally, Family Care for Orphans website, MINISTRY OF EDUCATION AND SCIENCE, 
http://www.usynovite.ru/ (last accessed Apr. 3, 2013) (providing support and information for current 
and prospective foster and adoptive families within Russia). 
135 Russian Family Code, supra note 127, art. 123(1).  
136 Family Care for Orphans website, MINISTRY OF EDUCATION AND SCIENCE, Statistics – 
2011, http://www.usynovite.ru/statistics/2011/1/ (reporting that of 82.117 children reported to be 
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2012
137
 – resident in institutions.
138
 Additionally, despite some state 
measures aimed at reducing the incidence of abandonment and 
involuntary deprivation of parental rights, UNICEF reported in 2010 that 
“the inflow of children into state care has not declined,”
139
 meaning that 
there is a constant turnover of parentless children and social orphans into 
and out of the system. 
 In this context, intercountry adoption is one aspect of Russia’s 
gradual push away from institutionalization and towards family care. 
However, intercountry adoption as a partial solution to Russia’s child 
welfare problems is controversial and divisive. Nationalist sentiment 
speaks against the care of Russian children by foreigners as denigrating 
to Russian pride.
140
 Some have gone so far as to analogize it to “cultural 
genocide.”
141
 Adding fuel to popular anti-adoption feelings are 
occasional rumors of corruption and of Westerners “buying” Russian 
children.
142
  Russia’s Children’s Ombudsman, Pavel Astakhov, is a 
particularly vocal opponent of intercountry adoption
143
 who has 
                                                                                                                       
without family care in 2011, 67,500 were transferred to family-based care including through 
adoption, paid and unpaid foster placements, and trusteeships). See, further, UNICEF 2010 Report, 
supra note 120 (noting that of children without parental care, the majority live in family settings); 
UNICEF 2007 Report, supra note 120, at 70 (noting that 74% of orphans had been placed in family 
placements as of 2004). 
137 Most Orphanages to be Closed in Russia, Children to be Adopted, ITAR-TASS NEWS 
AGENCY (Feb. 28, 2012, 11:31 AM), http://www.itar-tass.com/en/c154/353743.html. 
138 Schwirtz, supra note 122 (reporting that as of 2008, over 200,000 “orphans” lived in 
institutions in Russia, the quality of which varied widely; noting recent abuse scandals at a 
Yekaterinburg hospital); UNICEF 2010 Report, supra note 120 (stating that 130,000 “orphans” live 
in state institutions); Statistical Snapshots: Russia’s Children at Risk, supra note 122 (reporting that 
the number of orphanages has increased by 100% in the last decade, with a total of 2.176 orphanages 
in Russia today); UNICEF 2007 Report, supra note 120, at 70-71 (noting that institutional care grew 
by 4.8% between 2000 and 2004). See, further, Altshuler, supra note Error! Bookmark not 
defined. (arguing that there are strong anti-reform interest groups in Russia who are financially 
interested in preserving the traditional orphan-producing structure). 
139 UNICEF 2010 Report, supra note 120. C.f. Altshuler, Alternative Report – 2013, supra note 
128 (noting a decline in the number of children in institutions from 2003 to 2009, but attributing this 
to the decline of Russia’s child population generally).  
140 Hora, supra note 105, at 1022 (“The Russians are deeply sensitive to any suggestions that 
they cannot look after their own needy children.”); Donovan Steltzner, Intercountry Adoption: 
Toward a Regime that Recognizes the “Best Interests” of Adoptive Parents, 35 CaSE W. RES. J. 
INT’L L. 113, 125 (2003); Michael Mainville, Prospective Parents Flock to Russia to Adopt, but 
some Balk at Westerns ‘Buying’ Children, THE NEW YORK SUn (Nov. 16, 2004), 
http://www.nysun.com/foreign/prospective-parents-flock-to-russia-to-adopt-but/4877/ (referring to 
the “deep embarrassment many Russians feel that the country is exporting its children”). 
141 Steltzner, supra note 140, at 125. 
142 Mainville, supra note 140 (noting, in 2004, of politicians making such claims – “It’s a dirty 
country that sells its children” (citing a Communist Party deputy)); Hora, supra note 105, at 1022 
(“Media accounts of international adoption in Russia and the United States are permeated with 
suspicion and mistrust.”); Joan Oleck, From Russia – With Red Tape, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK 
(May 18, 1998) (noting “wild rumors such as one about Americans selling adopted babies’ organs, 
have touched off a backlash against foreigners”.). 
143 See, generally, David Herszenhorn, Russian Who Led U.S. Adoption Ban has Flair for 
Celebrity and Controversy, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Feb. 22, 2013), 
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repeatedly voiced a nationalist-sounding view that “Russia’s children” 
should be kept in Russia,
144
 and in 2011 addressed the Supreme Court 
with a request to introduce a moratorium on foreign adoptions.
145
 Prime 
Minister Dmitry Medvedev, on the other hand, has expressed the view 
that foreign adoptions are not of themselves problematic, given the 
extent of Russia’s child welfare problems.
146
 The Russian Family Code 
provides that the adoption of children by foreigners shall only occur 
when it is impossible to bring a child into a Russian family,
147
 thus 
apparently prioritizing in-country (temporary) foster care over 
intercountry adoption.  
 
 3. Failed Adoptions and Subsequent Reform 
The international adoption regime has been beset, over the years, by 
various scandals and controversies, primarily relating to baby stealing, 
kidnaping and buying.
148
 Russia has remained fairly free of the taint of 
these scandals, it being widely accepted that Russian adoptees are in fact 
“legitimately eligible for adoption.”
149
 However, while thousands of 
Russian adoptions have by all reports been successful, a smaller number 
of well-publicized adoptions have ended horrifically. Russia claims that 
at least twenty Russian children have been killed, whether intentionally 
or otherwise, by their American parents over the years.
150
 Further, as 
                                                                                                                       
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/23/world/europe/pavel-astakhov-the-man-behind-us-adoption-
ban.html?pagewanted=all. 
144 Quotes of the Day, TIME WORLD (Apr. 16, 2010), 
http://www.time.com/time/quotes/0,26174,1982523,00.html (“We must, as much as possible, keep 
our children in our country.”). 
145 Maria Domnitskaya, Pavel Astakhov: Russia with No Orphans – Such It Will Be, THE 
VOICE OF RUSSIA (15:43 PM, Dec. 29, 2011), http://english.ruvr.ru/2011/12/29/63119494/. 
146 Working Meeting with Pavel Astakhov and Yury Chaika, PRESIDENT OF RUSSIA WEBSITE 
(Dec. 3, 2011), available at http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/3160. 
147 Russian Family Code, supra note 127, § 124(4) (“The adoption of children by foreign 
citizens or by stateless persons shall be admitted only in cases when it is impossible to give these 
children for upbringing into the families of citizens of the Russian Federation, who permanently 
reside on the territory of the Russian Federation, or for adoption to the children’s relatives, 
regardless of the citizenship or the place of residence of these relatives.”). 
148 See, generally, Smolin, The Future and Past of Intercountry Adoption, supra note 123, 
describing the incidence of child buying, stealing, kidnaping and trafficking within the international 
adoption system, with particular attention to Cambodia, India and Guatemala.  
149 Id., at 125 (dividing sending nations into three groups – those with consistently clean 
reputations, such as China and South Korea; those such as Russia with few problems relating to 
child laundering, but ongoing issues with bribery; and those with significant child laundering issues). 
See, further, Hora, supra note 105, at 1021 (noting, as of 2002, issues with bribery and corruption in 
Russian intercountry adoption). But see, also, UNICEF 2007 Report, supra note 120, 74 (noting 
general human trafficking problems in Russia, as an “origin, transit and destination country for 
women, men and children trafficked for sexual and labor exploitation”). 
150 Russia Slams US Child Abuse ‘Double Standards’, RIA NOVOSTI (Dec. 13, 2012, 12:50 
PM), http://en.rian.ru/russia/20121213/178128109.html (citing Russia’s children ombudsman Pavel 
Astakhov); Andrew Hiller, Russia Awaits Investigation into Adopted Boy’s “Shocking” Death in 
Texas, VOICE OF RUSSIA (Feb. 18, 2013), 
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David Smolin points out, these dead children “represent the extremes of 
a much broader phenomenon of post-institutionalized Russian children 
doing very poorly in their new environments.”
151
 A much larger number 
of Russian adoption placements to the U.S. have failed, with children 
being re-institutionalized, hospitalized, surrendered to the U.S. foster 
care system or privately re-adopted.
152
  
Such failed adoptions have been well-documented elsewhere;
153
 
a few examples will serve to illustrate the variety of cases that have 
sparked concern and outrage in both sending country and receiving 
country: 
 In 1996, David Polreis, Jr. died at the age of two, six months 
after his adoption by a Colorado family. His adoptive mother 
was sentenced to twenty-two years in prison for child abuse 
resulting in David’s death. Her defense, that David suffered 
from Reactive Attachment Disorder which caused him to 
inflict pain on himself, was refuted by evidence that his 
mother had routinely beat him. The sentencing judge 
acknowledged David’s illness, but commented that society 
“cannot accept any less protection for its troubled children 
than for those who develop normally.”
154
 
 In 2001, Viktor Matthey died at the age of seven, ten months 
after his adoption by a New Jersey family, of cardiac arrest 
due to hypothermia, after being “imprisoned” in an unheated 
and damp pump room by his adoptive parents.
155
 He also 
suffered malnutrition and physical beatings.
156
 His parents’ 
defense was that Viktor “self-injured.”
157
 They were 
                                                                                                                       
http://voicerussia.com/radio_broadcast/70924886/105272181/ (transcript of interview with 
Konstantin Dolgov, special representative for human rights in the Russian Foreign Ministry: “If they 
find that the boy [Max Shatto] was killed by his American parents, it’ll be number twenty!” [Russian 
adoptees killed in America]); see also Russian Adoption Ban Not Linked to Magnitsky Act – 
Medvedev, supra note 12. According to Moscow, between 1991 and 2005, 1220 children have died 
while in the care of Russian adoptive parents (Anna Arutunyan, Who Supports the Ban – and Why, 
THE MOSCOW NEWS (Dec. 24, 2012, 21:52 PM) – these equally tragic incidents are beyond the 
scope of this paper. 
151 Smolin, The Future and Past of Intercountry Adoption, supra note 123, at 474. 
152 Id., at 474 (noting the large number of Russian adoptees in the U.S. who have been 
“institutionalized, hospitalized, placed into the United States foster care system, or otherwise have 
failed to adapt to their adoptive placements”); Pickert, supra note 124. 
153 See, especially, Allen, supra note 105; Pickert, supra note 124; Smolin, The Future and 
Past of Intercountry Adoption, supra note 123.  
154 Katharine Q. Seelye, Woman Sentenced to 22 Years in Death of Adopted Son, THE NEW 
YORK TIMES (Sep. 23, 1997). 
155 Matthew Reilly & Saed Hindash, The Short Life of Viktor Matthey, NEWARK STAR-LEDGER 
(Oct. 28, 2001) (available at http://dartcenter.org/content/short-life-viktor-
matthey#.UVzYvJNJM1I).  
156 Elizabeth Evans, Adopted Child’s Death a Familiar Tragedy, THE YORK DISPATCH (Aug. 3, 
2010), http://www.yorkdispatch.com/local/ci_14633756.  
157 Id. 
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sentenced to ten year prison terms for child abuse, and four 




 In 2003, Jessica Hagmann died at the age of two, from 
smothering. Her mother, who claimed she accidentally 
smothered Jessica while trying to calm a tantrum, was 
sentenced to probation and two suspended terms.
159
 
 In 2003, Masha Allen was rescued from her adopter, 
Matthew Mancuso, who had adopted Masha at the age of 
four and had been raping and sexually exploiting her via the 
Internet for nearly five years.
160
 Mancuso, a divorced father 
who (it was later discovered) had molested his own 
daughter,
161
 had found Masha through an American adoption 




 In 2005, Nina Victoria Hilt died at the age of two. Her 
adoptive mother admitted punching and kicking the girl to 




 In 2009, Nathaniel Craver died at the age of seven, from a 
severe head injury. His parents said he had serious mental 
and emotional problems that caused him to repeatedly injure 
himself. They were acquitted of murder but convicted for 




 In 2010, Justin Hansen, aged seven, was sent back to 
Moscow, alone, with a letter from his adoptive mother 
                                                     
158 Laura Craven, Mattheys Sentenced to Four Years for Viktor’s Death, NJ.COM (May 10, 
2007), http://blog.nj.com/ledgerupdates/2007/05/mattheys_sentenced_to_4_years.html. 
159 Russell Working, Adoptee Deaths Rare, Experts Say, CHICAGO TRIBUNE NEWS (May 21, 
2004), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2004-05-21/news/0405210350_1_adoptive-families-adam-
pertman-emotional-disorders/2. 
160 Heroic Young Girl Tells of her Child Porn Ordeal, ABC NEWS (Dec. 1, 2005), 
http://abcnews.go.com/Primetime/LegalCenter/story?id=1364110#.UVzjjJNJM1I.  
161 David Smolin, Child Laundering as Exploitation: Applying Anti-Trafficking Norms to 
Intercountry Adoption Under the Coming Hague Regime, 32 VT. L. REV. 1, 22 (2007); Sexual 
Exploitation of Children Over the Internet: Follow-up Issues to the Masha Allen Adoption: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 109th 
Cong. 106-13 (2006), available at http://poundpuplegacy.org/files/SexualExploitationHearing.txt. 
162 Heroic Young Girl Tells of her Child Porn Ordeal, supra note 160. 
163 Theresa Vargas, Mother Admits Killing Daughter, THE WASHINGTON POST (Mar. 2, 2006), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/03/01/AR2006030102380.html.  
164 David Herszenhorn, Russia Attacks Sentence of Adoptee’s Parents, THE NEW YORK TIMES 
(Nov. 19, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/20/world/europe/russia-angry-at-penalty-against-
dead-adopted-boys-parents.html?_r=0; Rick Lee, Cravers Sentenced in Death of Adopted Russian 
Son, YORK DAILY RECORD (Nov. 21, 2011), http://www.ydr.com/ci_19365008.  
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stating she no longer wished to parent him,
165
 and that he had 
severe psychological problems. Ms. Hansen claimed that the 
Russian orphanage authorities had misled her regarding the 
child’s “mental stability and other issues.”
166
 Ms. Hansen 
was subsequently ordered to pay $150,000 in child support 




 In 2012, Daniel Sweeney, age nine, ran away from his 
adoptive parents, Matthew and Amy Sweeney, six years 
after his adoption. Authorities found signs of severe beatings 
on his body.
168
 His parents were indicted in January 2013.
169
 
 In 2013, Max Shatto, age three, died from multiple 
injuries.
170
 The Russian Children’s Ombudsman, Pavel 
Astakhov, accused Max’s parents of beating him to death.
171
 
A Texas jury ruled that the death was accidental, that 
Maxim’s pre-existing bruises were self-inflicted, and that 





Some failed adoptions, such as the Masha Allen case, clearly 
represent gross cruelty and deviance on the part of adoptive parents. 
                                                     
165 Will Stewart, Fury as U.S. Woman Adopts Russian Boy, 7, Then Sends Him Back Alone with 
Note Saying: “I Don’t Want Him Anymore”, DAILY MAIL (U.K.), Apr. 9, 2010, 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1264744/American-sends-adopted-Russian-boy-
behavioural-problems.html (including a picture of the accompanying letter). 
166 Id. See, further, Damien Cave, In Tenn., Reminders of a Boy Returned to Russia, THE NEW 
YORK TIMES, Apr. 10, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/11/us/11adopt.html (noting that the 
Hansens have “portrayed themselves as victims”, claiming that Justin had threatened to kill family 
members). 
167 Tennessee Woman Appeals Court Order to Pay $1,000-a-month Child Support for Adopted 
Son She Sent BACK to Russia, DAILY MAIL (Aug. 17, 2012), 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2189797/Tennessee-woman-appeals-court-ordered-child-
support-adopted-boy-sent-BACK-Russia.html (noting that the adoption agency who processed 
Justin’s adoption brought the action “to deter others from doing anything similar” and to send a 
message to Russia that accountability systems are in place). Note that the (subsequent) Russian-
American Agreement, discussed infra, expressly provides that an adoptive parent is obligated to 
“bear full responsibility for the care of the child and for his or her upbringing” (supra note 14, 
§11(1)).  
168 Justin Karp et al., Matthew and Amy Sweeney Arrested, Accused of Repeated Abuse of Son, 
ABC NEWS (Jul. 19, 2012), http://www.wjla.com/articles/2012/07/matthew-and-amy-sweeney-
arrested-accused-of-repeated-abuse-of-son-78001.html.  
169 Americans to Stand Trial for Abusing Russian Child, THE VOICE OF RUSSIA (Jan. 8, 2013), 
http://english.ruvr.ru/2013_01_08/Americans-to-stand-trial-for-abusing-Russian-child/.  
170 U.S. Court Convinced Maxim Kuzmin’s Death Accidental, PRAVDA.RU (Mar. 19, 2013), 
http://english.pravda.ru/news/hotspots/19-03-2013/124102-maxim_kuzmin-0/. 
171 Kremlin’s Child Advocate ‘Upset’ as US Parents Cleared, RIA NOVOSTI (Mar. 19, 2013), 
http://en.rian.ru/world/20130319/180106575.html.  
172 Betsy Blaney, Prosecutors: No Charges in Adopted Russian Boy’s Death, USA TODAY 
(Mar. 18, 2013), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/03/18/adopted-russian-boy-
texas/1997631/.  
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However, the majority of failed adoptions are less black and white, and 
involve a multitude of intersecting contributing factors. These include: 
problems with parental screening;
173
 incomplete disclosure of the special 
needs of (especially older) institutionalized children;
174
 and inadequate 
pre-adoption training
175
 and post-adoption support
176
 for parents in light 
of those needs. As a result, a disproportionate number of intercountry 
adoptions from Russia, as compared to other sending countries, have 
resulted in dissolution
177
 – primarily due to behavioral and attachment 
issues relating to institutionalization – or death.
178
  
The Russian government has responded to various incidents of 
adoption failures with political statements of condemnation. The 
repeated rhetoric is that Russian children in America are not adequately 
protected from negligence and abuse, in part due to lenient sentences.
179
 
                                                     
173 See, generally, Allen, supra note 105, at 1704 (noting the Masha Allen case as an example 
of “the system’s failure to discover red flags in a prospective adopter’s background”); New Adoption 
Rules Urged after Murder, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (Jul. 13, 2005) (reporting the Russian call for 
psychological testing for prospective adoptive parents of Russian children, in the wake of the Nina 
Hilt case). 
174 Vargas, supra note 163 (noting that the high number of Russian adoptee deaths “could be in 
part because many of the Russian children who are adopted have behavioral and developmental 
problems either passed to them from parents with poor prenatal care, including fetal alcohol 
syndrome, or the result of their growing up in orphanages. Adoptive parents … are given little 
preparation for what to expect”); Cindi Lash, Overwhelmed Families Dissolve Adoptions, POST-
GAZETTE (Aug. 14, 2000), http://old.post-gazette.com/headlines/20000814russiadaytwo1.asp (noting 
a growing incidence of dissolution of Russian and Eastern European adoptions due to psychological 
problems associated with institutionalization).   
175 New Adoption Rules Urged after Murder, supra note 173 (reporting the Russian Education 
Ministry’s call for mandatory training programs for prospective adoptive parents, in the wake of the 
Nina Hilt case); Deborah Tedford, Russian Case Spotlights Potential Adoption Risks, NATIONAL 
PUBLIC RADIO (Apr. 13, 2010) (noting that [untrained] adoptive parents can exacerbate the “wounds 
of institutional kids” by overstimulation). 
176 See, e.g., cases of David Polreis Jr., Nina Hilt and Jessica Haggman, discussed supra; see, 
generally, Diane Mapes, It Takes More than Love: What Happens with Adoption Fails, TODAY 
(Aug. 1, 2012), http://www.today.com/moms/it-takes-more-love-what-happens-when-adoption-fails-
918076 (discussing the dissolution of adoptions due to parents’ inability to cope with the special 
psychological needs of older adopted children). 
177 Dissolution refers to the severance of the legal relationship between adoptive parent and 
adopted child after the adoption is legally finalized: Adoption Disruption and Dissolution, CHILD 
WELFARE INFORMATION GATEWAY, June 2012, at 3, available at 
https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubs/s_disrup.pdf. It results in privately- or state-arranged foster care 
or adoption by new care-givers. On the disproportionate number of Russian adoption dissolutions, 
see: Lash, supra note 174 (reporting “’a much higher incidence of problem cases’ that lead to failed 
adoptions among Russian and Eastern European children”); Russian Orphans Present Unique 
Challenges: One Family’s Story, RIA NOVOSTI (Dec. 14, 2012), 
http://en.ria.ru/russia/20121214/178147175.html (“Adoption experts say Russian orphans are more 
likely to exhibit [self-soothing] behaviors because they are generally kept in state care for longer 
periods of time than children in some other countries. They are also institutionalized, rather than 
being housed in smaller, foster care homes … and are more often removed from their homes by 
authorities rather than being abandoned at birth. … There is a higher incidence in Russia of things 
like exposure to drugs, abuse, neglect, and fetal alcohol syndrome.”). 
178 Vargas, supra note 163 (“Adoption experts said they could not point to as many deaths 
among children adopted from any other country.”). 
179 Russian Orphans Present Unique Challenges, supra note 177 (“There is still frustration 
among many in the Russian Federation about what they see as a double standard that allows adoptive 
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Failed adoptions have also prompted occasional threats of a moratorium 
on intercountry adoptions to American parents,
 180
 which have at times 
resulted in delays in processing adoption orders
181
 and regional bans.
182
  
More substantively, a number of legislative revisions of the 
Russian intercountry program have taken place. For example, in 1998, 
partly in response to a 1997 incident involving alleged abuse of Russian 
adoptees by their American parents on the flight from Russia to the 
                                                                                                                       
U.S. parents who harm their Russian children to dodge the harsher penalties many Russian officials 
feel they deserve.”); Herszenhom, supra note 164 (citing the Russian Foreign Ministry describing 
the Craver verdict as “amazingly and flagrantly irresponsible”); Barry, supra note 8 (quoting the first 
deputy chief of the pro-Kremlin United Russia party, responding to the acquittal of Miles Harrison: 
“When we give our children to the West and they die, for some reason the West always tells us it 
was just an accident.”); Russian MFA Information and Press Department Commentary on the 
Acquittal Handed Down by an American Court for Miles Harrison who had been Charged with 
Involuntary Manslaughter in the Death of his Russian Adoptee Dima Yakovlev, THE MINISTRY OF 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, supra note 10 (referring to the Miles Harrison 
acquittal as “repulsive and unprecedented”, and inferring a connection between Chase Harrison’s 
status as a Russian adoptee, and the lack of adequate punishment for the tragedy of his death); 
Konstantin Dolgov, Russian Foreign Ministry Human Rights Envoy, Letter to Senator Landrieu 
(Jan. 14, 2013), available at http://assets.nationaljournal.com/pdf/Dolgov-Landrieu%20(Russian).pdf 
(translation: 
http://www.ccainstitute.org/images/stories/pdf/international_adoption/english%20translation%20-
%20russian%20response%20to%20dec%2021%20congressional%20letter.pdf) (hereinafter Letter to 
Senator Landrieu) (“We cannot accept outrageous cases of lawlessness, when the murderers of 
Russian children were released directly in the courtroom or when they got away with probation, 
while we learnt from the mass media that the U.S. justice can demonstrate due severity in cases of 
abuse against minor U.S. citizens.”). 
180 Shannon Thompson, The 1998 Russian Federation Family Code Provisions on Intercountry 
Adoption Break the Hague Convention Ratification Gridlock: What Next? An Analysis of Post-
Ratification Ramifications on Securing a Uniform Process of International Adoption, 9 TRANSNAT’L 
L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 703, 705 (1999) (noting legislation considered by the Russian Duma in 1998 
to “restrain or practically restrict international adoption of Russian children.”); Vargas, supra note 
163 (noting “Russian officials initially called for a moratorium on U.S. adoptions [following Nina 
Hilt’s 2006 death] although they have eased back on the threat.”); John Kass, No Returns or 
Exchanges: Case of Boy sent back to Moscow Alone Reopens Debate on Russian Adoptions, 
CHICAGO TRIBUNE (Apr. 13, 2010) (reporting the Russian foreign minister’s response to the 2010 
Hansen case – “We have taken the decision to suggest a freeze on any adoptions to American 
families until Russia and the U.S. sign an international agreement.”); Anna Redyukhina, Saving 
Foreign Adoption, THE WASHINGTON POST (Jun. 22, 2010), 
http://russianow.washingtonpost.com/2010/06/saving-foreign-adoption.php; Russia to Halt U.S. 
Adoptions Amid Domestic Violence Claims, USA TODAY (Feb. 11, 2012), 
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/story/2012-02-11/Russia-US-adoptions/53048064/1 
(discussing a February 2012 call for suspension of American adoptions following an “incessant 
string of crimes”). 
181 See, e.g., Judge Upholds Child Support in Russian Adoption, COLUMBIA DAILY HERALD 
(Jul. 13, 2012), http://columbiadailyherald.com/sections/news/state/judge-upholds-child-support-
russian-adoption.html (noting that the Hansen case “contributed to a decision by Russia in 2010 to 
delay some adoptions by U.S. parents”); Notice: Regional Suspensions on Adoption Processing in 
Russia, INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION, U.S. DEP’T OF STATe (Mar. 1, 2012) (noting that the Department 
of State has received reports of a “de facto freeze” on adoptions to the U.S. from some parts of 
Russia). 
182 Siberians Ban Americans from Adopting Russian Children, RIA NOVOSTI (Jul. 5, 2012), 
http://english.ruvr.ru/2012_07_05/Siberians-bar-Americans-from-adopting-Russian-children/ 
(reporting a Kemerovo Region bill preventing Americans from adopting children on the territory of 
the region, in response to three deaths of Kemerovo Region children in American families since 
1990). 
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U.S.,
183
 the Russian Family Code was amended to increase state control 
over adoptions, and ban the involvement of intermediaries or 
“facilitators”
184
 in light of problems relating to corrupt intermediary 
practices and charges.
185
 In 2000, a Presidential decree required Russian 
government accreditation of foreign adoption agencies.
186
 In 2005, the 
length of time a child must remain the state orphan database before 
adoption by a foreigner increased from three months to six months.
187
 
Partly as a result of these measures, adoptions of Russian children to 
America peaked in 2004, and have been steadily declining since then,
188
 




The most significant overhaul of Russia-U.S. adoptions took 
place in 2012. Precipitated by the Justin Hansen incident,
190
 a year of 
negotiations
191
 between Russia and the U.S. resulted in the signing of the 
Russian-American Agreement
192
 on July 13 2011, which entered into 
force on November 1 2012.
193
 The Russian-American Agreement aimed 
to “strengthen procedural safeguards” in the U.S.-Russia adoption 
process,
194
 and addressed many of the screening, training and monitoring 
concerns arising from aforementioned cases of failed adoptions.
195
 
                                                     
183 Kleem, supra note 66, at 331. 
184 Russian Family Code, supra note 127, § 126.1 (enacted by Federal Law NO. 94-FZ of June 
27, 1998) (“Any intermediary activity in the adoption of children, that is, any activity of third parties 
with the purpose of selecting and transferring children for adoption in the name and in the interest of 
persons wishing to adopt children shall be impermissible.”); see, further, Thompson, supra note 180, 
at 710 (discussing the amendments). 
185 Allen, supra note 105, at 1713-14 (discussing problems relating to corrupt facilitators). 
186 Hora, supra note 105, at 1019 (“On March 29, 2000, Russian President Vladimir Putin 
signed a decree [that] requires that foreign adoption agencies be accredited by the Russian 
government and establish offices in Russia.”). C.f. Anna Arutunyan, Foreign Adoptions Down in 
Russia as Foster Care Grows, THE MOSCOW NEWS (Nov. 27, 2008), 
http://themoscownews.com/news/20081127/55359067.html (noting new accreditation rules for 
foreign adoption agencies coming into effect in 2007). 
187 Laura Ashley Martin, “[T]he universal language is not violence. It’s love[:]* The Pavlis 
Murder and Why Russia Changed the Russian Family Code and Policy on Foreign Adoptions, 26 
PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 709, 724-5 (2007-2008); Russian Family Code, supra note 127, § 124.4. 
188 Statistics: Russia, INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 
http://adoption.state.gov/about_us/statistics.php (showing a peak of 5.862 adoptions in 2004, down 
to 1,079 in 2010). 
189 Arutunyan, supra note 186 (noting that the decline in Russian adoptions to the U.S. “do[es] 
not indicate that Russians are adopting more children” but rather that the number of children cared 
for in alternative in-country foster care initiatives has increased).  
190 Allen, supra note 105, at 1693. 
191 FAQs: Bilateral Adoption Agreement with Russia, INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION. U.S. DEP’T 
OF STAte (Oct. 15, 2012), available at 
http://adoption.state.gov/content/pdf/Russia_Bilateral_Adoption_Agreement_FAQs1012.pdf (noting 
that negotiations began in April 2010). 
192 Supra note 14. 
193 FAQs: Bilateral Adoption Agreement with Russia, supra note 191. 
194 Id. (at “Why is there a Bilateral Adoption Agreement with Russia?”). 
195 Russian-American Agreement, supra note 14, §8(1), §10(1) (pre-approval state screening of 
adoptive parents’ suitability and eligibility, taking into account “all information available about the 
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Moreover, the Agreement acknowledges Russian concerns about the 
equal treatment of Russian children in America, by expressly 




C. January 1, 2013: The Adoption Ban 
The Russian government expressed its commitment to continued 
cooperation on improving the intercountry adoption process as recently 
as September 2012.
197
 However, before the Russian-American 
Agreement had been fully implemented,
198
 and before its impact on the 
adoption process had been felt or tested,
199
 Russia-U.S. adoptions came 
to an abrupt halt with the passing of the Adoption Ban on December 28 
2012,
 200
 which took effect on January 1, 2013.
201
 The Russian-American 
Agreement, according to its terms, will remain in force for one year from 
                                                                                                                       
child matched with the prospective adoptive parents” including medical and special needs); 
§10(1)(b) (psycho-social preparation of prospective adoptive parents that takes into account 
“detailed information about the child’s social situation and health, and his or her cultural and social 
environment in the Country of Origin”); §14 and §5 (requiring that the Sending Country be informed 
and consulted on post-adoption dissolutions and consent to subsequent placements); §5(1) (post-
adoption monitoring, including the submission of reports to the Country of Origin). See, generally, 
Allen, supra note 105, at 1727-17331 (discussing the major changes to the Russia-U.S. adoption 
process proposed by the treaty). See, further, Russia to Halt U.S. Adoptions Amid Domestic Violence 
Claims, supra note 180 (reporting that after the signing of the U.S.-Russia Agreement, but prior to 
its ratification, Russia briefly called for a further bilateral accord allowing Russian monitors to carry 
out post-adoption inspections in American homes). 
196 Russian-American Agreement, supra note 14, § 13(2) (“[A child adopted in accordance 
with this Agreement] shall have the same rights and protections as any other adopted child who has 
the status of a citizen in the territory of the Receiving Country.”); see, further, Preamble 
(“Recognizing that a child adopted in accordance with the procedures established by this Agreement 
should be provided with the same advantages and the same rights that are guaranteed to him or her 
as a citizen or lawful permanent resident of the Receiving Country (whichever applies).”). 
197 Joint Statement of the U.S.-Russian Consultations on the Bilateral Agreement Regarding 
Cooperation in Adoption of Children, Press Release, EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES MOSCOW, 
RUSSIA (Sep. 28, 2012) (“The United States and the Russian Federation confirm their mutual 
preparedness to continue cooperation on an intercountry adoption process that provides better 
safeguards for adoptive children…”.). See, further, The Russia-USA Child Adoption Agreement 
Successfully Went Through the Ratification Process, CHILDREN’S RIGHTS COMMISSIONER FOR THE 
PRESIDENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION (2011), http://english.rfdeti.ru/display.php?id=4226 
(Children’s Ombudsman Pavel Astkahov praising the Agreement as “offer[ing] more guarantees” of 
Russian-born children adopted abroad). 
198 FAQs: Bilateral Adoption Agreement with Russia, supra note 191 (noting that the Russian 
government expected adoption agency authorization procedures to become effective on or about 
March 1, 2013). 
199 See, generally, Allen, supra note 105 (discussing U.S.-Russia Agreement’s likelihood of 
success). 
200 Supra notes 4 - 6, and accompanying text. 
201 Alert: Legislation to Ban Intercountry Adoption by U.S. Families, Intercountry Adoption, 
U.S. DEP.’T OF STATE, Jan. 3, 2013, available at 
http://adoption.state.gov/country_information/country_specific_alerts_notices.php?alert_notice_type
=alerts&alert_notice_file=russia_8 (noting that the Adoption Ban went into effect on January 1, 
2013). 
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Russia’s notification of its termination.
202
 There was some speculation 
that because of this provision, Russia would be obliged to allow 
adoptions to continue for a further year,
203
 but the Kremlin has refuted 
this.
204
 According to the U.S. State Department, there were 884 adoptions 
in process that were interrupted by the ban, 337 of which involving 
parents who had already met the prospective adoptee.
205
 In the wake of 
the ban, the U.S. expressed hope that cases that had begun to be 
processed would be seen to completion “in the spirit of the original 
agreement and out of humanitarian concern.”
206
 Russia’s Supreme Court 
issued a letter in January 2013 stating that adoptions that had been court-
approved
207
 prior to the New Year would be completed, notwithstanding 




                                                     
202 Russian-American Agreement, supra note 14, § 17(5) (“The agreement is valid over one 
year beginning from the date on party informs the other via diplomatic channels about its intention to 
withdraw from the present agreement.”). 
203 Ellen Barry, Russia to Let a Few U.S. Adoptions Go On, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Jan. 10, 
2013) (quoting a prominent Russian lawyer as stating that adoptions should continue due to the 
precedence of the international treaty over the Adoption Ban); Moscow: Americans can Adopt 
Russian Kids Until 2014, CNN (Jan. 11, 2013), 
http://www.cnn.com/2013/01/10/world/europe/russia-us-adoptions; Russia-U.S. Adoption Deal to 
Last Till 2014 – Putin Spokesman, RIA NOVOSTI (Jan. 10, 2013), 
http://en.rian.ru/russia/20130110/178694199/Bilateral_Russia-US_Adoption_Agreement.html.  
204 Barry, supra note 203 (quoting Kremlin press secretary: “There is no direct link between 
[the bilateral treaty] and the ban on adoption. The agreement is not something that makes adoption 
obligatory. It regulates the practice.”); Kremlin Comment Unlikely to Change Russian Adoption Ban, 
RIA NOVOSTI (Jan. 10, 2013), http://en.ria.ru/russia/20130110/178697643.html (“the Russian 
Foreign Ministry emphasized that the agreement was now ‘terminated,’ not suspended as stated by 
the U.S. State Department a day earlier.”). 
205 Candice Ruud, Local Family Skirts by Ban on Russian Adoption, NEWSDAY (Mar. 11, 
2013); see, further, Olga Belogolova, Russian Adoption Ban is Personal for Some U.S. Lawmakers, 
NATIONAL JOURNAL (Jan. 29, 2013) ( “as many as 1,000 American families had already begun the 
adoption process when the Russian law passed. Many families have already traveled to Russia and 
met the children they were hoping to adopt.”). Note that Russia requires international adoptive 
parents to travel to Russia to spend time with their prospective adoptive child once a match has been 
made, but prior to the final court order: Traveling to Russia, EUROPEAN CHILDREN ADOPTION 
SERVICES, http://www.ecasus.org/Site.Programs.AdoptionfromRussia.TravelingtoRussia.go.  C.f. 
Barry, supra note 203 (“Russian officials have said that there are 46 children whose adoptions by 
American families have been partially processed, but that not all of them have court orders.”). 
206 Barry, supra note 203 (quoting Victoria Nuland, a spokesperson for the State Department). 
207 Russian Family Code, supra note 127, § 125(1) (“The adoption shall be effected by the 
court upon the application of the persons wishing to adopt the child.”). See, generally, Belogolova, 
supra note 205 (“The court decree comes late in the process, after parents have been matched with a 
child and orphanage workers have begun preparing the child to join a new family. After court 
approval, there is a 30-day waiting period, and only then can parents return and make final 
arrangements to take the child to the United States.”). 
208 Ruud, supra note 205 (stating that around 25 American families have completed the 
adoption of a Russian child since the Adoption Ban took effect); Jim Maceda, Outrage, Sadness as 
Americans Barred from Adopting Russian Children, NBC NEWS (Mar. 30, 2013), 
http://worldnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/03/30/17504450-outrage-sadness-as-americans-barred-
from-adopting-russian-children?lite (referring to a Minnesota couple who adopted their Russian 
daughter in February as the “last lucky couple to leave Russia with an adopted child.”); c.f. Blake 
Ellis, Russia’s Adoption Ban Costs Families their Tax Credit, CNN MONEY (Mar. 15, 2013) (“The 
State Department estimates that only around 50 families [had already received a court ruling and 
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 Public response to the ban in Russia was mixed. A 10,000-strong 
“march against scoundrels”, protesting the ban, took place in Moscow in 
January.
209
 An equally large pro-ban rally took place in March, a day 
after Texan authorities found that Max Shatto’s
210
 death was an 
accident.
211
 In the U.S., the ban caused a “sharp reaction in 
Washington.”
212
 Both houses of Congress passed resolutions expressing 
disappointment, urging reconsideration and calling for the conclusion of 
adoptions of children who had already been matched with adoptive 
parents.
213
 The ban brought uncertainty and grave disappointment to 
adoptive parents at various stages of completing a Russian adoption, 
including those who had already traveled to Russia and bonded with their 
matched child.
214
 An appeal has been filed with the European Court of 
Human Rights on behalf of prospective American adoptive parents 




                                                                                                                       
final adoption decree].”); Jerry Votava, Russia Delays Enforcement of U.S. Adoption Ban Law, 
JURIST (Jan. 10, 2013), http://jurist.org/paperchase/2013/01/russia-delays-enforcement-of-us-
adoption-ban-law.php (“46 adoptions … were in process when the [Adoption Ban] was scheduled to 
take effect.”). 
209 Ellen Barry & Andrew Roth, Russians Rally Against Adoption Ban in a Revival of Anti-
Kremlin Protests, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Jan. 13, 2013) (noting that the city authorities estimated a 
turnout of 9.500, while activists reported at turnout of 24,000). See, further, Russian Lawmakers 
Reject Petition Against Adoption Ban, RIA NOVOSTI (Jan. 14, 2013), 
http://en.ria.ru/politics/20130114/178770385.html (noting a petition to repeal the ban, which 
garnered more than 100,000 signatures, but that was rejected by a Russian Duma committee). 
210 Supra note 170 and accompanying text. 
211 Elks & Gutterman, supra note 29. According to polls, “about half of Russians approve of 
the Dima Yakovlev Act … while about 30 percent disapprove” (Fred Weir, Emotions Intensify over 
U.S.-Russia Adoption Ban, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR (Mar. 4, 2013), 
http://www.alaskadispatch.com/article/20130304/emotions-intensify-over-us-russia-adoption-ban).  
212 David Herszenhorn, Russian Adoption Ban Brings Uncertainty and Outrage, THE NEW 
YORK TIMES (Dec. 28, 2012). 
213 S. Res. 628, 112th Cong. (2011-2012); H.R. Res. 24, 113th Cong. (2013-2014). 
214 Id. See, further, Ruud, supra note 205; Ellis, supra note 208 (noting the financial cost of 
interrupted adoptions); Belogolova, supra note 205 (“As many as 1,000 American families had 
already begun the adoption process when the Russian law passed. Many families have already 
traveled to Russia and met the children they were hoping to adopt.”). 
215 Yulia Ponomareva, Americans Challenge Adoption Ban in European Court, RUSSIA 
BEYOND THE HEADLINES (Jan. 27, 2013), 
http://rbth.ru/society/2013/01/27/americans_challenge_adoption_ban_in_strasbourg_22251.html 
(noting a complaint filed with the ECHR by lawyers from the Center of International Protection, 
asking the ECHR to allow in-process adoptions to proceed, and to oblige Russia to overturn the 
law); International Law Experts Discuss “Anti-Magnitsky” Legislation, RIGHTS IN RUSSIA (Jan. 24, 
2013), available at http://hro.rightsinrussia.info/archive/european-court/cip/adoptions. The case has 
not yet been listed on the European Court of Human Rights website: 
http://www.echr.coe.int/ECHR/EN/Header/Pending+Cases/Pending+cases/Calendar+of+scheduled+
hearings/. 
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II. SETTING THE FRAMEWORK: INTERNATIONAL LAWS OF CHILD 
WELFARE AND ADOPTION 
The effect of Russia’s ban on adoptions to American families is yet to 
play out, but will certainly involve a significant decrease in Russian 
intercountry adoptions generally, due to the high proportion of Russian 
international adoptees historically adopted to the U.S.
216
 Part II considers 
the international laws and principles relevant to Russia’s prioritization of 
in-country care over American adoptions. Part II.A traces the 
development of international legal principles and instruments relating to 
intercountry adoption, including the Hague Convention and alternative 
bilateral treaties. Part II.B introduces the Council of Europe approach to 
international adoption, including European Court of Human Rights case 
law.  
 
A. The International Approach: Shifting Prioritization of Intercountry 
Adoption 
 1.  Best Interests and Subsidiarity Principles 
The incidence of intercountry adoption steadily grew in the latter half of 
the 21
st
 century, however an international framework to regulate the 
practice was lacking until promulgation of the 1993 Hague Convention 
on Intercountry Adoption.
217
 A number of preceding international 
instruments are also relevant to intercountry adoption practice and 
policy. The U.N. Declaration on the Rights of the Child set forth the 
principle that the “best interests of the child shall be the paramount 
consideration” in all laws enacted for the protection of minors.
218
 It was 
not until the 1980s that the subject of international adoption was 
specifically addressed, with the U.N. Declaration on Social and Legal 
Principles Relating to the Protection and Welfare of Children, with 
Special Reference to Foster Placement and Adoption Nationally and 
Internationally (hereinafter Declaration on Adoption).
219
 The Declaration 
on Adoption affirms the paramountcy of the “best interests” principle in 
                                                     
216 International Adoption Statistics: Russia, AUSTRALIAN INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION 
NETWORK, http://www.aican.org/statistics.php?region=0&type=birth (last visited Apr. 15, 2012) 
(2011: 38.66% of Russian international adoptees were adopted to the U.S.; 38.29% in 2010; 41.57% 
in 2009). 
217 Supra note 70. See, generally, Carlson, supra note 94, at 247 (noting that prior to the Hague 
Convention, “international adoption law consisted of vague, hortatory declarations of little practical 
value and bilateral or regional agreements of limited scope”). 
218 Declaration of the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 1386 (XIV), U.N. GAOR, 14 th Sess., 841st 
plen. mtg., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/4354 (Nov. 20, 1959) [hereinafter Declaration of the Rights 
of the Child], princ. 2. 
219 G.A. Res. 41/85, U.N. Doc. A/RES/41/85 (Dec. 1, 1986). 
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adoption matters,
220
 and sets out the first basic international framework 
for intercountry adoption practices.
221
 Importantly, the Declaration 
establishes that intercountry adoption is subject to the subsidiarity 
principle: it prioritizes in-country (temporary) foster or other “suitable” 
care (the term seems wide enough to cover institutionalization) over 
intercountry (permanent) adoption,
222
 and thereby evinces a preference 
for keeping children in their home countries as much as possible.
223
 In 
line with this neutrality towards intercountry adoption, the Declaration is 
deferential to national governments regarding the decision of whether or 
not to participate in intercountry adoption – in short, it does not speak in 
favor of, or impose an obligation to establish, intercountry adoption.
224
   
This permissive, “last resort” approach to intercountry adoption is 
replicated in the 1989 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the 
Child,
225
 to which Russia is a state party.
226
 The UNCRC emphasizes a 
child’s right to grow up in the context of his/her family and culture.
227
 
 More recently, a shift has taken place in United Nations’ 
discourse on the prioritization of intercountry adoption vis-à-vis in-
country institutionalization. In 2004, the United Nations Children’s Fund 
(UNICEF), which monitors the UNCRC, issued a “clarifi[cation] that 
institutionalization was to be used only as a last resort and as a temporary 
measure until a family could be found,” listing intercountry adoption as 
                                                     
220 Id, art. 5 (“In all matters relating to the placement of a child outside the care of the child’s 
own parents, the best interests of the child, particularly his or her need for affection and right to 
security and continuing care, should be the paramount consideration.”). 
221 See, generally, Liu, supra note 59, at 195-7. 
222 Declaration on Adoption, supra note 219, art. 17 (“If a child cannot be placed in a foster or 
an adoptive family or cannot in any suitable manner  be cared for in the country of origin, 
intercountry adoption may be considered as an alternative means of providing the child with a 
family.”). 
223 Liu, supra note 59, at 197. 
224 Declaration on Adoption, supra note 219, pmbl (“The principles set forth hereunder do not 
impose on states such legal institutions as foster placement or adoption.”); art. 17 (“…intercountry 
adoption may be considered as an alternative means of providing the child with a family” [emphasis 
added]); prmbl. (“Recognizing that under the principal legal systems of the world, various valuable 
alternative institutions exist, such as the Kafala of Islamic Law, which provide substitutive care to 
children who cannot be cared for by their own parents;” and further, “Recognizing further that only 
where a particular institution is recognized and regulated by the domestic law of a State would the 
provisions of this Declaration relating to that institution be relevant…”). 
225 Supra note 69, art. 21 (“State Parties that recognize and/or permit the system of adoption 
shall ensure that the best interests of the child shall be the paramount consideration and they shall: 
… (b) Recognize that intercountry adoption may be considered as an alternative means of child’s 
care, if the child cannot be placed in a foster or an adoptive family or cannot in any suitable manner 
be cared for in the child’s country of origin ….”). See, also, art. 20(3) (listing foster placement, 
kafalah of Islamic law, adoption and institutionalization as possible types of “alternative care” for 
children deprived of their family environment). 
226 The UNCRC has been ratified by every country except the United States, Somalia and 
South Sudan: The Convention on the Rights of the Child, THE STATE OF THE WORLD’S CHILDREN 
2012, UNICEF, at 16 (available at http://www.unicef.org/sowc2012/pdfs/SOWC-2012-The-
Convention-on-the-Rights-of-the-Child.pdf). 
227 UNCRC, supra note 69, art. 8(1). 
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“one of a range of care options” that may be optimal for “individual 
children who cannot be placed in a permanent family setting in their 
countries of origin.”
228
  The most recent UNICEF position on 
intercountry adoption avoids explicit references to the comparative value 
of institutionalization and intercountry adoption.
229
 Rather, it emphasizes 
children’s rights – to know and be cared for by his or her parents as far as 
possible;
230
 and to grow up in a family environment
231
 – and provides 
that “appropriate and stable family-based solutions should be sought” for 
children not in the care of their parents.
232
 The “stable” qualifier seems to 
imply a preference for intercountry (permanent) adoption over in-country 





 2. The Hague Convention 
In 1987, the Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference noted the 
desirability of a new international convention on intercountry adoption 
cooperation.
234
 Preparation of the convention was included in the agenda 
of the Seventeenth Session of the Hague Conference as a matter of 
priority, in recognition of “insufficient existing domestic and 
international legal instruments, and the need for a multilateral 
approach.”
235
 Russia was a participant in the final of three drafting 
sessions.
236
 The Hague Convention was adopted in 1993, and applies to 
                                                     
228 Jini Roby, Understanding Sending Country’s Traditions and Policies in International 
Adoptions: Avoiding Legal and Cultural Pitfalls, 6 J. L. & FAM. STUD. 303, 318-319 note 87 (2004). 
229 UNICEF’s Position on Inter-country Adoption, PRESS CENTRE, UNICEF, Jul. 22, 2010, 
available at http://www.unicef.org/media/media_41918.html. 
230 UNCRC, supra note 69, art. 7(1). 
231 UNCRC, supra note 69, prmbl. (“Recognizing that the child, for the full and harmonious 
development of his or her personality, should grow up in a family environment, in an atmosphere of 
happiness, love and understanding.”); UNICEF’s Position on Inter-country Adoption, supra note 229 
(stating that the UNCRC “clearly states that every child has the right to grow up in a family 
environment”). 
232 UNICEF’s Position on Inter-country Adoption, supra note 229. 
233 Id. (“Inter-country adoption is among the range of stable care options. For individual 
children who cannot be cared for in a family setting in their country of origin, inter-country adoption 
may be the best permanent solution.”). Note: the ECtHR case of Pini v Romania (discussed infra, 
note 340) demonstrates that foster care has the potential to provide a stable, family environment 
([153]). 
234 Hans van Loon, Note on the Desirability of Preparing a new Convention on International 
Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption, Prel. Doc. No. 9 of December 1987 (for the 
attention of the Special Commission of January 1988), in Hague Conference on Private 
International Law, Proceedings of the Sixteenth Session (1988), Tome I, Miscellaneous Matters, The 
Hague 1991, pp. 165-185. 
235 Gonzalo Parra-Aranguren, Explanatory Report on the Convention on Protection of Children 
and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption, HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, PROCEEDINGS OF THE SEVENTEENTH SESSION, available at 
http://www.hcch.net/upload/expl33e.pdf [hereinafter Hague Convention Explanatory Report]. 
236 Id. at n. 19 (listing the non-Member States that participated in the third meeting of the 
Special Commission on Intercountry adoption, 3 – 14 February 1992). 
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international adoptions between contracting states.
237
 Russia signed the 
Convention in 2000, but has not ratified,
238
  meaning Russia is not legally 




The Hague Convention represents a shift in international discourse 
away from the absolute last resort approach to intercountry adoption. 
Like the UNCRC, the Hague Convention draws short of declaring that 
children have a “right to a family,” although the (non-binding) preamble, 
echoing the UNCRC, does recognize “that the child, for the full and 
harmonious development of his or her personality, should grow up in a 
family environment, in an atmosphere of happiness, love and 
understanding.”
240
 Professor Dillon thus concludes that the Hague 
Convention “strongly implies – though this might have been made 
clearer – that in-country institutional care and non-family care are not 
superior alternatives to intercountry adoption.”
241
 The Preamble also 
recognizes that “intercountry adoption may offer the advantage of a 
permanent family to a child for whom a suitable family cannot be found” 
in the state of origin.
242
  
This formulation – “children for whom a suitable family cannot be 
found” – replaced an earlier draft, which referred instead to “children 
who cannot in any suitable manner be cared for in his or her country of 
origin.”
243
 The modification, which was initially met with some 
resistance in the drafting process,
244
 is significant. Although the Hague 
Convention’s formulation of the subsidiarity principle does not expressly 
prioritize intercountry adoption over in-country foster-care and 
institutionalization,
245
 the Explanatory Report states that that was the 
                                                     
237 Hague Convention, supra note 70, art. 2(1). 
238 Status Table: Convention of 29 May 1993 on Protection of Children and Co-operation in 
Respect of Intercountry Adoption, HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, 
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.status&cid=69 (last accessed Apr. 16, 2013). 
239 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, art. 18 (“A 
state is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty when (a) it 
has signed the treaty or has exchanged instruments constituting the treaty subject to ratification, 
acceptance or approval, until it shall have made its intention clear not to become a party to the 
treaty.”).  
240 Hague Convention, supra note 70, prmbl. According to international law, preambles do not 
establish binding legal obligations, but do have “legal force and effect from the interpretative 
standpoint” (G. G. Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice: Treaty 
Interpretation and Certain Other Treaty Points, 28 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 1, 25 (1951). 
241 Dillon, supra note 60, at 213. 
242 Hague Convention, supra note 70. 
243 Hague Convention Explanatory Report, supra note 235, [45]. 
244 Hague Convention Explanatory Report, supra note 235, [45] (noting that Colombia had 
unsuccessfully requested the modification in Working Document No. 2. The modification was 
subsequently “approved by a clear majority, without discussion of the substance”). 
245 Hague Convention, supra note 70, art. 4(b) (“An adoption within the scope of the 
Convention shall take place only if the competent authorities of the State of origin have determined, 
after possibilities for placement of the child within the State of origin have been given due 
consideration, that an intercountry adoption is in the child’s best interests.”). See, generally, Carlson, 
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intended and preferred interpretation of the substantive provisions in 
light of the Preamble.
246
 Ultimately, however, the Hague Convention is 
deferential, as a political necessity,
247
 to national governments in their 





 3. Alternative Regulation: Bilateral Treaties 
The U.S. government encourages participation in the Hague Convention 
as the preferred international instrument for governing intercountry 
adoption.
249
 However, like many sending and receiving countries, Russia 
has declined to sign the Hague Convention,
250
 claiming that the 
instrument does not sufficiently protect adoptee rights and interests.
251
 





                                                                                                                       
supra note 94, at 261-2 (describing the cautious approach of the Hague’s Special Commission on 
Intercountry Adoption on this point, and noting reactive concern among the U.S. delegation and 
observers, “some of whom questioned whether the U.S. could agree to a Convention that perpetuated 
the U.N.’s potentially pernicious attitude toward intercountry adoption”.).  
246 Hague Convention Explanatory Report, supra note 235, [46] (“The idea behind the 
amendment [of the Preamble] is that the placement of a child in a family, including in intercountry 
adoption, is the best option among all forms of alternative care, in particular to be preferred over 
institutionalization.”). See, further, The Implementation and Operation of the 1993 Hague 
Intercountry Adoption Convention Guide to Good Practice, Guide No. 1, HAGUE CONFERENCE ON 
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 30 (2008) (“It is sometimes said that the correct interpretation of 
“subsidiarity” is that intercountry adoption should be seen as a “last resort”. This is not the aim of 
the Convention. National solutions for children such as remaining permanently in an institution, or 
having many temporary foster homes, cannot, in the majority of cases, be considered as preferred 
solutions ahead of intercountry adoption. In this context, institutionalization is considered as “a last 
resort.””). 
247 Carlson, supra note 94., at 262-4 (discussing the drafting negotiations over whether to move 
away from the U.N.’s prior stance on intercountry adoption). 
248 Dillon, supra note 60, at 215 (“The Hague Convention leaves a good deal of discretion in 
the hands of national bureaucracies, and does not clearly address the human rights implications of 
institutionalization.”). 
249 U.S. Dep’t of State, Helsinki Commission Testimony (Sep. 14, 2005), http://2001-
2009.state.gov/r/pa/ei/othertstmy/54301.htm (“[W]e encourage other nations to become parties to the 
Hague Convention The U.S. government considers this instrument to be most effective in 
establishing a set of internationally agreed requirements and procedures to govern intercountry 
adoptions.”). 
250 O’HALLORAN, supra note 34, at 161 (“The Hague Convention does not apply to many 
countries currently participating in intercountry adoption.”). See, generally, Status Table, Hague 
Convention, Hague Conference on Private International Law, 
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.status&cid=69  (significant non-member 
sending nations include Ethiopia, South Korea, and Ukraine). 
251 Russian-Italian Bilateral Adoption Treaty, BLOG – RUSSIAN ADOPTION HELP (Oct. 9, 
2009), http://blog.russianadoptionhelp.com/2009/10/russian-italian-bilateral-adoption.html.  
252 Российские дети – итальянские усыновители [Russian Children – Italian Adoptive 
Parents], Zakonia (Oct. 5, 2009), http://www.zakonia.ru/news/30/49668. 
253 Yelena Kovachich, Russia, France Sign Agreement on Child Adoption (Nov. 18, 2011), 
http://english.ruvr.ru/2011/11/18/60645603/. 
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the U.S.
254
 Similar bilateral treaties with the United Kingdom, Holland, 
Spain and Germany are in progress.
255
  
The first bilateral treaty was concluded with Italy in 2008,
256
 in 
response to concerns over child trafficking.
257
 The Russian-Italian 
Adoption Treaty goes further than the Hague Convention in some 
respects, providing for “a higher possibility of enforced intervention in 
cases of disruption, abuse or neglect of adopted Russian children.”
258
 
This agreement was used as a template for the subsequent agreements 
with France and the United States.
259
  
In terms of the subsidiarity principle, taking the Russian-American 
Agreement as an example, the Preamble reflects the language of the 
Hague Convention, referring to intercountry adoption as a possible 
solution where a “suitable family” cannot be found in the child’s country 
of origin.
260
 Article 3 provides that the treaty covers adoptions where 
child cannot be brought up in his or her birth family, and “it does not 
appear to be possible to settle him or her for upbringing or place him or 
her with a family that could provide for his or her upbringing or adoption 
in the Russian Federation.” This provision defers the decision of whether 
or not in-country care is available to the sending country, without taking 
a clear position on whether institutionalization is to be preferred or not to 
intercountry adoption. Domestic Russian law appears to prefer 




                                                     
254 Russian-American Agreement, supra note 14. 
255 Russia to Sign Adoption Agreement, UPI (Nov. 14, 2011), 
http://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2011/11/14/Russia-to-sign-adoption-agreement/UPI-
73961321290713/ (citing Children’s Rights Ombudsman Pavel Astkahov). Pavel Astkahov has 
stated that intercountry adoption should only take place if bilateral agreements are in place. 
256 Российские дети – итальянские усыновители [Russian Children – Italian Adoptive 
Parents], supra note 252.  
257 Smetanina, supra note 126 (“That agreement was concluded only after a scandal erupted 
over the illegal export of Russian children.”).  
258 Russian-Italian Bilateral Adoption Treaty, supra note 251. C.f. O’HALLORAN, supra note 
34, at 161 (arguing that bilateral treaties “undermine the international effort to build a principled 
framework for regulating this form of adoption.”). 
259 Anna Redyukhina, Saving Foreign Adoption, THE WASHINGTON POST (Jun. 22, 2010), 
http://russianow.washingtonpost.com/2010/06/saving-foreign-adoption.php. 
260 Russian-American Agreement, supra note 14, prmbl (“Recognizing that intercountry 
adoption of a boy or girl … may offer the advantages of a permanent family to a child if a suitable 
family cannot be found for the child in the Country of Origin.”). 
261 Russian Family Code, supra note 127, art. 124(4) (“The adoption of children by foreign 
citizens or by stateless persons shall be admitted only in cases when it is impossible to give these 
children for upbringing into the families of citizens of the Russian Federation, who permanently 
reside on the territory of the Russian Federation, or for adoption to the children’s relatives, 
regardless of the citizenship or the place of residence of these relatives.”). 
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B. The Council of Europe Approach: Ambiguity and Caution 
There is a strong tradition of both sending and receiving children via 
intercountry adoption in Europe.
262
 A number of regional instruments are 
relevant to the practice. The European Convention on the Adoption of 
Children,
263
 which was revised in 2008,
264
 sets minimum standards for 
adoption laws in member states.
265
 The European Convention for Human 
Rights
266
 is not a child-specific instrument, but enshrines the right to 
respect for family life,
267
 and the right to start a family.
268
 Given the lack 
of strong enforcement mechanisms in the Hague Convention and the 
European Adoption Convention, Magdalena Forowicz observes that the 
European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter ECtHR) “has been able to 
play a fundamental role by enforcing these instruments within the 
framework of the ECHR.”
269
 The ECtHR has applied the ECHR to a 
number of adoption-related cases,
270
 including one relating to 
intercountry adoption.
271
 Ingi Iusmen notes that “under the ECHR 
framework, intercountry adoption has been interpreted as an extreme 
measure.”
272
 Russia, although a member of the Council of Europe, is yet 
to sign the ECAC,
273
 but is subject to the ECHR.
274
 
                                                     
262 O’HALLORAN, supra note 34, at 138 (“Europe in general and Scandinavia in particular has 
also over many decades accepted children from other countries for adoption placements.”). 
263 634 U.N.T.S. 256, entered into force on 26 April 1968. 
264 European Convention on the Adoption of Children (Revised), Nov. 27, 2008, C.E.T.S. 202 
(hereinafter ECAC). 
265 Factsheet: Towards a European Adoption Procedure, COUNCIL OF EUROPE (Sep. 7, 2009), 
available at https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1496717&Site=DC. 
266 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
Nov.4, 1950, Europ. T.S. No. 5; 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (hereinafter ECHR). 
267 Id., art. 8 (“Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right 
except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests 
of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of 
disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others.”). 
268 Id., art. 12 (“Men and women of marriageable age have the right to marry and to found a 
family, according to the national laws governing the exercise of this right.”). 
269 MAGDALENA FOROWICZ, THE RECEPTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE EUROPEAN 
COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 121 (2010). 
270 See, e.g., List of Judgments Concerning Adoption (non-exhaustive), COUNCIL OF EUROPE 
FAMILY LAW, available at http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/family/Case_law_en.asp. 
271 Pini and Betrani and Manera and Atripaldi v Romania (App Nos 78028/01; 78030/01), 
judgment, 22 June 2004, Reports 2004-V, 297 (hereinafter Pini v Romania). See, further, Nigar 
Gozum v Turkey, lodged with the ECtHR on Jan. 12, 2010 (currently pending). 
272 Ingi Iusmen, The EU and International Adoption from Romania, 27(1) INT’L J. L. POL. & 
FAM. 1, 6 (2013). See, further, Bainham, supra note 59, at 233 (arguing that for intercountry 
adoption to be justified under the ECHR, it must be demonstrated that no other solution can 
adequately meet the needs of the child). 
273 Chart of Signatures and Ratifications, European Convention on the Adoption of Children 
(Revised), Council of Europe (last accessed Apr. 18, 2013), 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=202&CM=8&DF=&CL=ENG.  
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The Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly has affirmed both 
the best interests principle, and the subsidiarity principle, although 
without being clear on whether intercountry adoption should be 
subsidiary to in-country foster care and/or institutionalization.
275
 In 2005, 
some delegates to the Parliamentary Assembly signed a motion regarding 
the “less than positive attitudes to international adoptions” expressed by 
a number of Eastern European countries, including Romania and Russia, 
and calling for ascertainment of whether restrictions on intercountry 
adoptions are consistent with the “overarching interests of the child, 
considering the very high number of children living in institutions.”
276
  
On the other hand, the Council of Europe has also expressed 
concern about the rise in intercountry adoptions from Russia in the 
1990s,
277
 and the practice generally: 
The purpose of international adoption must be to provide 
children with a mother and a father in a way that respects 
their rights, not to enable foreign parents to satisfy their 
wish for a child at any price; there can be no right to a child. 
The Assembly therefore fiercely opposes the current 
transformation of international adoption into nothing short 
of a market regulated by the capitalist laws of supply and 
demand, and characterized by a one-way flow of children 
from poor states or states in transition to developed 
countries. … It wishes to alert European public opinion to 
the fact that, sadly, international adoption can lead to the 
disregard of children’s rights and that it does not necessarily 
serve their best interests. In many cases, receiving countries 
perpetuate misleading notions about children’s 
circumstances in their countries of origin and a stubbornly 
prejudicial belief in the advantages for a foreign child of 
being adopted and living in a rich country.
278
 
                                                                                                                       
274 Chart of Signatures and Ratifications, ECHR, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=005&CM=&DF=&CL=ENG.  
275 Eur. Parl. Ass., Recommendation 1443: International Adoption: Respecting Children’s 
Rights, 5th Sitting (2000), at 1, 2 and 3 [hereinafter Recommendation 1443] (“international adoption 
may be considered only if domestic solutions are not available.”). C.f.  Eur. Parl. Ass., Reply from 
the Committee of Ministers: Recommendation 1443, 785th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies, Doc. 
No. 9377 (Mar. 1, 2002) (noting the subsidiarity principle, but further opining that “international 
adoption can, nevertheless, have the advantage of providing a permanent family home to a child for 
whom no suitable family can be found in the country of origin.”). 
276 Eur. Parl. Ass., International Adoption: Motion for a Recommendation, presented by Mrs. 
Paoletti Tangheroni, Doc. 10617 (Jun. 28, 2005). 
277 Council of Europe Committee on Migration, Refugees and Demography, International 
Adoption: Respecting Children’s Rights, Doc. No. 8600 (Dec. 21, 1999) (“International adoption 
was unknown in the countries of the former eastern bloc. These countries in transition, in particular 
Albania, Romania, Bulgaria and Russia, have seen a worrying increase in adoption.”). 
278 Recommendation 1443, supra note 275, at 1, 2 and 3. 
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This statement was accompanied by a number of recommendations, 
including that member states ratify the Hague Convention and develop 




III. EVALUATING THE BAN: RIGHTS AND DUTIES RELEVANT TO 
INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION 
Part III evaluates Russia’s ban on adoptions to America in light of 
international law and Russia’s duties to its children. Part III.A considers 
the political aspects of the Adoption Ban and intercountry adoption 
generally. Part III.B examines whether Russian children have a right to 
be adopted, and whether the Russian state has a duty to repeal the 
Adoption Ban. Russia has the prerogative to strive to meet her children’s 
needs domestically, without resorting to intercountry adoption – there is 
no right to intercountry adoption per se, and no obligation under 
international law to recognize the institution of adoption. However, it is 
argued that the Adoption Ban represents the subordination of the best 
interests of children to state-centric political considerations. This is 
problematic, in terms of the immediate needs and interests of Russian 
children currently in need of families. Russia should be encouraged to 
reconsider the Adoption Ban, and pursue the dual goals of eliminating 
the need for intercountry adoption, and allowing the practice to continue, 
including to American families, in the interim. 
 
A. The Politicization of Orphan Welfare – in Russia and Beyond 
Russia’s ban on adoptions to America has been variously defended as a 
proportionate response to deaths and other failed adoptions,
280
 and 
criticized as Magnitsky Act retaliation that uses children as “political 
pawns.”
281
 On the one hand, Russia has expressed concern on many 
occasions over failed adoptions and the number of Russian adoptees to 
have died in America, and threatened moratoriums or bans on 
intercountry adoption in response.
282
 Some Russian politicians have also 
                                                     
279 Id., at 5(i) and 5(iii). 
280 Dolgov, Letter to Senator Landrieu, supra note 179 (“The decision taken … to ban the 
adoption of Russian children to the U.S. was a difficult but necessary measure provoked by a 
consistently non-constructive position of the U.S. federal and local authorities.”). 
281 Human Rights Watch, Russia: Reject Adoption Ban Bill (Dec. 21, 2012), 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/12/21/russia-reject-adoption-ban-bill (“It’s wrong to make 
vulnerable children pawns in a cynical act of political retribution.”); Elks & Gutterman, supra note 
29 (“Critics … accuse the Kremlin and lawmakers of using particularly vulnerable children as 
political pawns.”); Laura Jean, Russia’s Adoption Ban Harms Kids, CNN (Jan. 17, 2013) (“Children 
living in orphan institutions need world leaders who do not use them as political pawns, but rather 
work to protect them. Russia’s adoption ban must be lifted.”).  
282 Supra at notes 180 - 182, and accompanying text. C.f. Susan Alvarado, Dima Yakovlev Bill, 
Russian Adoptions, and Dissolutions by Death, ADOPTION THERAPIST BLOG (Dec. 29, 2012), 
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expressed discomfort with intercountry adoption generally,
283
 due to the 
imperialist/national pride concerns discussed above.
284
 Russia of course 
has the prerogative to define its child welfare system as it pleases, in 
accordance with the international law principle of the best interests of the 
child. However on the other hand, it would be wrong to characterize the 
ban as a simple continuation of a movement away from intercountry 
adoption – it pertains only to American adoptions, and there are clearly 
other non-child-centric political factors, both domestic and international, 










 have denied that the Adoption Ban is 
politically motivated, maintaining an official position that the ban was 
necessary in light of failed adoptions. The shortcomings and problems 
relating to those Russia-U.S. adoptions were very recently addressed, by 
the 2012 Russian-American Agreement.
289
 However, Russia contends 
that the Russian-American Agreement had already been proven 
ineffective. In a January 2013 letter responding to U.S. Senators’ 
concerns over the Adoption Ban, Russia’s Foreign Ministry human rights 
envoy, Konstantin Dolgov, argued that since November 2012, American 
courts had “regularly” refused to allow Russian consular representatives 
access to Russian adoptees in America in cases of alleged abuse and 
neglect, and that the U.S. had thereby “sabotaged” the bilateral treaty
290
 
                                                                                                                       
http://adoptiontherapist.org/blog/2012/12/29/dima-yakovlev-bill-russian-adoptions-and-dissolutions-
by-death (arguing that if failed adoptions/deaths were “truly the motivation for [the Adoption Ban] 
Russia most certainly would not have entered into a new negotiation on international adoptions with 
the U.S. as recently as November 2012 and this ban would have been enacted years ago.”). 
283 Igor Rustak, Russia May Ban All Foreign Adoptions, RIA Novosti (Jan. 11, 2013) (quoting 
Russian MP Evgeny Fyodorov: “In fact, [adoptions of Russian orphans by foreign families] is a 
purchase. None of the civilized countries are involved in slave trade, or sell their children abroad.”); 
Aden, supra note 119 (quoting Pavel Astakhov: “It’s a natural step for any normal state. The time 
has come for us to take care of our orphans ourselves.”). 
284 Supra at note 140 and accompanying text. 
285 News Conference of Vladimir Putin, PRESIDENT OF MOSCOW WEBSITE (Dec. 20, 2012), 
http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/4779 (“The issue at hand concerns official liability for these tragedies. 
People are exempt from criminal liability, and sometimes the judicial system does not even want to 
consider these cases. That’s what bothers Russian legislators, and this is what they are reacting to in 
the well-known draft [Adoption Ban] that triggered such a reaction.”). 
286 Russian Adoption Ban Not Linked to Magnitsky Act – Medvedev, supra note 12 (quoting 
Prime Minister Medvedev as saying that the Adoption Ban “expresses the concerns of Russia’s 
parliament, the Russian State Duma and the Federation Council, by the fate of our children”, and is 
an “emotional” move that is “neither in fact nor in law” linked to the Magnitsky Act);  
287 Young, supra note 27 (“Russia’s ban of adoptions by U.S. parents was enacted solely with 
the welfare of Russian children in mind, [Ambassador Kislyak] said this week.”). 
288 Aden, supra note 119 (Pavel Astkahov: “The ban is not an action taken against 
Americans.”). 
289 Supra at note 192 and accompanying text. 
290 Dolgov, Letter to Senator Landrieu, supra note 179; see, further, Natalya Kovalenko, US 
Failing to Honor Adoption Agreements – Exclusive Interview with Russian Diplomat, VOICE OF 
RUSSIA (Dec. 23, 2012), http://english.ruvr.ru/2012_12_23/US-failing-to-honour-adoption-
agreements-exclusive-interview-with-Russian-diplomat/; Russia Demands Explanations from U.S. 
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and ignores its general obligation to allow consular access to Russian 
citizens
291
 in the U.S.
292
  
Russia’s concern to be apprised of post-adoption situations is 
understandable, particularly in light of previous instances of appalling 
abuse and negligence. However, instead of relying on usual consular 
access rules in relation to adoptees, post-adoption follow-ups and 
reporting were key issues addressed by the bilateral adoption treaty. The 
treaty itself does not expressly require Russian access to adoptees post-
adoption, although there is a general good faith provision requiring 
Russian and American authorities to cooperate with one another.
293
 Post-
adoption reports are to be collected by authorized adoption agencies,
294
 
and parents are to be informed of their obligation to provide access to 
agency officials for this purpose.
295
 This cooperative approach, which 
leaves post-adoption accountability primarily in the hands of the 
receiving country, had not been fully tested or gauged when Russia 
announced the ban, and arguably any bumps in its implementation could 
have been smoothed over with continued negotiation and practice. Given 
                                                                                                                       
on a Recent Child Adoption Incident, INTERFAX (Sep. 26, 2012), 
http://rbth.ru/articles/2012/09/26/russia_demands_explanations_from_us_on_fresh_child_adoption_i
ncident_18586.html (reporting Russia’s most recent complaint on lack of consular access post-
adoption); News Conference of Vladimir Putin, supra note 285 (stating that the Adoption Ban was a 
response to the “fact that when a crime is committed against an adopted Russian child … Russian 
representatives are denied any access, even as observers, in these legal processes.”). 
291 Russian adoptees with American parents, in addition to acquiring American citizenship, 
retain Russian citizenship: Russian-American Agreement, supra note 14, art. 13(2). 
292 Dolgov, Letter to Senator Landrieu, supra note 179 (“This contradicts the obligations 
assumed by the U.S. side under the aforementioned agreement and the 1964 bilateral Russian-U.S. 
Consular Convention.”); Consular Convention and Protocol, U.S.-U.S.S.R., Jun. 1, 1964, 19 U.S.T. 
5018, art. 12(1) (“A consular officer shall have the right within his district to meet with, 
communicate with, assist, and advise any national of the sending state and, where necessary, arrange 
for legal assistance for him. The receiving state shall in no way restrict the access of nationals of the 
sending state to its consular establishments.”). See, further, Young, supra note 27 (“[Russian 
Ambassador to the U.S.] Kislyak said Russia considers its adoptees to be Russians with dual 
Russian-U.S. citizenship, a status that typically entitles a country to have consular access to its 
citizens when they are on foreign soil.”). Note: The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Apr. 
24, 1963, 596 U.N.T.S. 261) requires receiving States to inform sending States “without delay of any 
case where the appointment of a guardian or trustee appears to be in the interests of a minor … who 
is a national of the sending State” (art. 37(b)), but the provision does not cover cases of 
abuse/dissolution of Russian adoptees, because “a person who is a U.S. citizen and a national of 
another country may be treated exclusively as a U.S. citizen when in the United States.” (Consular 
Notification and Access, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Third Ed., Sep. 2010), at 14). Note: In response to 
Dolgov, U.S. Ambassador Michael McFaul tweeted that the U.S. would continue to honor all 
international agreements with Russia, including the bilateral consular convention (Michael McFaul, 
Twitter (Jan. 22, 2013).). This was reported in the Russian media as acknowledgement of a right of 
unrestricted access by Russian diplomats to adopted children in the U.S. (U.S. will Honor 1964 
Consular Convention on Diplomatic Access to Adopted Children, RUSSIAN LEGAL INFORMATION 
AGENCY (Jan. 23, 2013)), although McFaul’s statement did not go that far, and nor does the 
Russian-American Agreement. 
293 Russian-American Agreement, supra note 14, art. 4(1). 
294 Id. art. 5(1)(b). 
295 Id. art. 5(1)(a). 
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this, any contention that the ban was a necessary and proportionate 
measure to protect adoptees is somewhat undermined. 
Turning to the political dimensions of the discontinuance, the 
Adoption Ban was clearly a political reaction to the finger of blame the 
U.S. pointed at Russia by passing the Magnitsky Act.
296
 It is important to 
note who the Adoption Ban law was named for – Chase Harrison. This is 
significant because the controversy for Russia relating to Chase’s death 
was not about post-adoption reporting or parental screening (issues 
addressed by the Russian-American Agreement); rather, Russia took 
issue with what it saw as leniency towards Miles Harrison due to Chase 
Harrison’s status as a Russian-born adoptee.
297
 In this respect, the 
Adoption Ban is a “tit for tat” response to the Magnitsky Act,
298
 in which 
America objected to Russia’s failure to hold anyone accountable for 
Sergei Magnitsky’s death. Just as Senator John McCain, in introducing 
the Magnitsky Act, referred to a “culture of impunity” in Russia in 
relation to human rights,
299
 so Russia, through the Adoption Ban, has 
pointed out a culture of impunity in America in relation to the lack of 
justice for Russian adoptees.
300
 
                                                     
296 It has been widely portrayed in the media as such – see, e.g., Laurie Penny, Russia’s Ban on 
U.S. Adoption Isn’t About Children’s Rights, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 28, 2012); Magnitsky Case: 
Putin Signs Russian Ban on U.S. Adoptions, BBC (Dec. 28, 2012) (“The law is a reaction to the US 
Magnitsky Act.”); David Herszenhorn, Russian Adoption Ban Brings Uncertainty and Outrage, THE 
NEW YORK TIMES (Dec. 28, 2012) (“The adoption ban … was included in a broader law retaliating 
against the United States for an effort to punish Russian human rights violators.”). The U.S. State 
Department, and a number of members of the Council of Europe, have likewise characterized the 
ban as politically motivated: Eur. Parl. Ass. Written Declaration, Intercountry Adoption: Children as 
Hostages of International Relations,  Doc. No. 13113 (Jan. 29, 2013) (written declaration that the 
Adoption Ban renders Russian children hostage to transatlantic diplomatic tensions); Richard Solash, 
U.S. ‘Regrets,’ NGOs Slam Russian Adoption Ban, RADIO FREE EUROPE (Dec. 28, 2012), 
http://www.rferl.org/content/us-regrets-ngos-slam-russia-adoption-ban/24811326.html (“State 
Department spokesman Patrick Ventrell called the Russian move ‘politically motivated’.”). 
297 Supra, note 10 and accompanying text. 
298 Note: The Adoption Ban law mirrors the structure and substance of the Magnitsky Act – in 
addition to prohibiting U.S. adoptions, it “provides for sanctions for those guilty of violating the 
fundamental human rights and freedoms of Russian citizens”, bans entry for “U.S. citizens involved 
in such violations”, and allows Russia to “freeze the financial and other assets of U.S. citizens 
banned from entering its territory” (Press Release, A Law on Sanctions for Individuals Violating 
Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms of Russian Citizens has been Signed, PRESIDENT OF 
RUSSIA WEBSITE (Dec. 28, 2012), http://eng.kremlin.ru/acts/4810.).  
299 Jeremy Peters, U.S. Senate Passes Russian Trade Bill, with a Human Rights Caveat, THE 
NEW YORK TIMES (Dec. 6, 2012) (Senator John McCain: “This culture of impunity in Russia has 
been growing worse and worse.”; response from Russia: “This is an attempt to interfere in our 
internal affairs, in the authority of Russia’s investigative and judicial organs, which continue to 
investigate the Magnitsky case.”). 
300 See, e.g., News Conference of Vladimir Putin, supra note 285 (“It is a fact that when a crime 
is committed against an adopted Russian child, the American justice system often does not react at 
all and releases the people who have clearly committed a criminal offense against a child, of any 
criminal responsibility.”); Dolgov, Letter to Senator Landrieu, supra note 179 (“Recently … local 
resident Elizabeth Escalona was sentenced to 99 years in prison for abusing her own daughter, who 
had to be taken to the intensive care as the result. At the same time, in cases of Russian children Ivan 
Skorobogatov [Nathaniel Craver, supra at note 164 and accompanying text], Ilya Kargyntsev [Isaac 
Dykstra], Dmitry Yakovlev [Chase Harrison, supra at note 10 and accompanying text], who were 
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There is a further, domestic, political dimension to the 
discontinuance. President Putin has been accused of adopting 
“aggressive foreign policy positions [such as the Adoption Ban] to 
strengthen his own legitimacy in the eyes of Russians.”
301
 Ania Viver has 
similarly argued that “the public discourse on international adoption has 
… served as a tool of Russian domestic policy to strengthen control over 
Russians and to spread anti-American attitudes.”
302
 By highlighting the 
minority of adoptions to America that end tragically, an “outside enemy” 
is created which is useful in domestic politicking.
303
  This promotion of 
nationalism relates to Russia’s desire to transform its self-presentation, 
from a country that shamefully exports its children due to an inability to 
care for them,
304
 to one which is better able to care for its children than 
“negligent and abusive” American parents.
305
 
The politicization of child welfare is admittedly troubling, and the 
Russian Adoption Ban arguably mirrors the politicization of intercountry 
adoption generally. Intercountry adoption concerns a nation’s ability to 
care for its most vulnerable, and whether it is culturally, socially and 
economically appropriate to look to other (more advanced and powerful) 
nations for support in that task. This strikes at the heart of a nation’s self-
presentation, and is a highly emotive issue. International law is 
accordingly deferential to state determinations of what is in the best 
interests of children without parents. At the same time, due to confusion 
about the purpose of intercountry adoption – which is to give children 
                                                                                                                       
tortured to death by their U.S. adoptive parents, the perpetrators have not received just 
punishment.”). See, further, Jonathan Earle,  Russians Not Lining Up to Adopt Americans, THE ST. 
PETERSBURG TIMES (Jan. 31, 2013) (noting that the Russian Investigative Committee has launched a 
symbolic criminal case against American parents of abused/deceased Russian adoptees). 
301 Weir, supra note 211. 
302 Ania Viver, Blame Them, Not Us: Adoption as a Political Tool, FOREIGN POLICY 
ASSOCIATION (Jan. 31, 2012), http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2012/01/31/blame-them-not-us-
adoption-as-a-political-tool/. 
303 Id.; see, further, Penny, supra note 296 (“This is about Russia thumbing its nose at 
America.”); Altshuler, supra note 139 (referring to the Adoption Ban as an “inhuman manifestation 
of the Anti-West bias”). 
304 See, e.g., Anthony D’Amato, Cross-Country Adoption: A Call to Action, 73 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 1239, 1245 (1997-1998) (discussing generally the propensity for sending country media to 
promote a discourse of shame pertaining to intercountry adoption). 
305 See, e.g., Aden, supra note 119 (quoting Pavel Astakhov: “The time has come for us to take 
care of our orphans ourselves.”); Fisher, supra note 122 (“This view of the world, in which Russia is 
portrayed as safe and prosperous while life in the U.S. is seen as dangerous and undesirable, just 
happens to be good for both Putin’s approval and the national self-esteem of millions of Russians, a 
sort of psychological escape hatch from two decades of stalled development and national 
humiliation.”); Weir, supra note 211 (quoting Irina Bergset, founder of Russian Mothers NGO: “We 
have a different attitude toward children here in Russia, perhaps due to cultural differences, we don’t 
treat them like cats and dogs.”); Michael Weiss, The Anti-Kremlin History of the Man Behind 
Putin’s Adoption Ban, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 11, 2013) (“Astkahov is prickly about the condition of 
children in Russia, a notorious stain on the country’s modernized self-presentation and the reason 
that so many orphans have been adopted by overseas parents.”). See, further, Earle, supra note 300 
(noting that in April 2012, Pavel Astakhov “encouraged Russians to get in line to take in American 
orphans ‘out of principle’”.). 
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families, not to give families children
306
 – and the resultant 
commodification of children, there can be untoward political pressure 
from the demand side of the market on sending countries to continue to 
“send.”
307
   
 
B. A Right to Adoption? Long-term and Short-term Perspectives 
 1. Russia’s Long-term Aim: Ending Intercountry Adoption 
Despite the obvious political nature of Russia’s American-targeted 
Adoption Ban, Russia’s rhetoric of moving away from intercountry 
adoption may also reflect a general belief that the best interests of 
Russian children are best served by raising them in Russia. The Adoption 
Ban was accompanied by apparent renewed vigor on the part of the 
Russian State in promoting and improving domestic adoption programs. 
On the same day the ban was promulgated, a Presidential decree aimed at 
improving domestic adoption procedures and efficiency was passed.
308
 
Instructions were issued in January 2013 towards fulfillment of the 
Decree, requiring various federal ministries to: implement increased 
assistance for prospective Russian adoptive parents; simplify the 
adoption procedure; provide post-placement state support; reduce the 
required number of post-placement reports from adoptive parents to the 
state; provide tax incentives for adoptive and foster parents; increase 
pensions to children with disabilities; increase the adoption allowance; 
and to provide for monthly payments to adoptive and foster parents 
dependent on the age and disabilities of the child.
309
 Draft laws were 
submitted to the Duma on February 26, 2013.
310
 In February, Children’s 
                                                     
306 D’Amato, supra note 304, at 1242 (“We don’t give a child to a family; we give a family to a 
child.”). 
307 See, generally, Iusmen, supra note 272; Bainham, supra note 59, at 225 (noting pressure on 
Romania to resume international adoption). 
308 Ukaz Prezidenta RF “O Nekotoryh Merah po Realizatsii Gosudarstvennoi Politiki v Sfere 
Zashchity Detei-Sirot i Detei, Ostavshihsia bez Popecheniia Roditelei” [Decree of the President of 
RF “On certain practices in realization of federal policies in the sphere of protection of children-
orphans and children who remained without parental care”], SOBRANIE ZAKONODATEL’STVA 
ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [SZ RF] [Russian Federation Collection of Legislation] Dec. 28, 2012, No. 
1688 (available at http://graph.document.kremlin.ru/page.aspx?1645431); see, further, Herszenhorn 
& Eckholm, supra note 76 (reporting President Putin referring to the decree as “changing the 
procedure of helping orphaned children, children left without parental care, and especially children 
who are in a disadvantageous situation due to their health problems”). 
309 On Ensuring the Fulfillment of the Presidential Executive Order to Protect Orphans and 
Children Left Without Parental Care, GOVERNMENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION (Jan. 14, 2013), 
available at http://government.ru/eng/docs/22372/. 
310 Draft Law on the Facilitation of the Adoption Process in the Russian Federation Submitted 
to the Duma, DEPARTMENT OF FEDERAL POLICY IN THE SPHERE OF CHILDREN RIGHTS PROTECTION, 
Feb. 26, 2013, available at http://www.usynovite.ru/massmedia/cb289af99e.html. 
6/26/2013] Inter-country Adoption 46 
DRAFT—DO NOT CITE 
Rights Ombudsman Astakhov announced a five to eight year aim of 
shutting down all orphanages and boarding schools.
311
 
There are obvious advantages to a long-term strategy of promoting 
in-country adoption over intercountry adoption. Given the importance of 
continuity of culture and identity rights,
312
 as recognized by the 
subsidiarity principle,
313
 providing appropriate, family-based in-country 
care is a laudable aim.
314
 Russia’s desire to shed the label/role of sending 
country, with its attendant overtones of imperialism and shame,
315
 is 
understandable. Russia is also concerned over low fertility rates – halting 
intercountry adoption could have a positive demographic impact (albeit a 
minor one).
316
 Finally, a long-term in-country aim could provide the 
impetus for a change in the general Russian approach to child welfare. 
As noted above, a large proportion of children in the Russian state 
system are “social orphans”,
317
 as opposed to “true” orphans with both 
parents deceased.
318
 Russia should be encouraged to develop positive 
measures aimed at assisting parents facing substance addictions or 
poverty so that families can stay together
319
 and pursuing reunification of 
relinquished children when it is in their best interests.
320
 This would 
provide better protection of parental rights, and the right of the child not 
to be unduly deprived of his or her family.
321
 It would also redress ethical 
                                                     
311 Most Orphanages to be Closed in Russia, Children to be Adopted, ITAR-TASS NEWS 
AGENCY (Feb. 28, 2012), http://www.itar-tass.com/en/c154/353743.html. 
312 See, e.g., UNCRC, supra note 69, art. 8 (right to preservation of identity, including 
nationality); Bainham, supra note 59, at 231 (“[I]nternational adoption poses a much more severe 
threat to the preservation of the child’s identity rights because of the geographical problems of 
maintaining contact. It also represents a threat to the child’s right to knowledge of his or her cultural, 
religious and linguistic background”). 
313 Supra at note 222, and accompanying text. 
314 This is recognized by the Hague Convention, which recalls that “each State should take, as a 
matter of priority, appropriate measures to enable the child to remain in the care of his or her family 
or origin,” and recognizes that “intercountry adoption may offer the advantage of a permanent 
family to a child for whom a suitable family cannot be found in his or her State of origin.” (emphasis 
added) (Hague Convention, supra note 70, prmbl.). 
315 Supra at note 64, and accompanying text. 
316 Cheryl Weitzstein, Russia’s Adoption Ban may be Way to Boost Population, THE 
WASHINGTON TIMES (Jan. 13, 2013). 
317 Supra note122, and accompanying text. 
318 Bainham, supra note 59, at n. 3 (“The normal understanding of an orphan is of a child both 
of whose parents have died.”). 
319 Declaration of the Rights of the Child, supra note 218, princ. 6 (“Payment of State and other 
assistance towards the maintenance of children of large families is desirable.”); UNCRC, supra note 
69, art. 27(3)). See, further, Comm. on the Rts. Of the Child, Consideration of Reports of the State 
Parties Under Article 44 of the Convention: Concluding Remarks of the Committee on the Rights of 
the Child: Italy, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.41 (Nov. 27, 1995), cited in King, supra note 49, at 457. 
For a discussion of similar initiatives in the U.S., see King, supra note 49, at 465. 
320 See, e.g., Smetanina, supra note 126 (noting a draft Ministry of Education law which would 
make assistance to families in need of work, and treatment for parents with alcohol or drug 
dependence, without threat of deprivation of parental rights). 
321 Russian Family Code, supra note 127, art. 54(2) (“Every child shall have the right to live 
and to be brought up in a family insofar as possible”); Declaration on Adoption, supra note 219, art. 
3 (“The first priority for a child is to be cared for by his or her own parents.”). See, further, King, 
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concerns about the propriety of allowing intercountry adoptions to take 
place for very large sums of money, when smaller upstream sums would 




 2. Short-Term Pain: Implications of the Adoption Ban on Russia’s 
Waiting Children 
A long-term aim of eradicating the need for intercountry adoption is a 
legitimate aim. International law places no obligation on states to partake 
in the institution of international adoption: the Declaration on Adoption 
expressly states that it “does not impose on states such legal institutions 
as foster placement or adoption”;
323
 the UNCRC takes an equally 
permissive approach.
324
 The instruments thus embody deference to local 
cultures and belief systems, some of which prohibit adoption and/or 
intercountry adoption.
325
 Even the Hague Convention, which goes further 
than previous instruments in promoting intercountry adoption, does not 
oblige signatories to make children available for adoption
326
 (Russia is 
not, in any event, a party). Further, it is axiomatic that international 
adoption does not represent a solution to the overall plight of vulnerable 
children in sending countries, given that international adoptees represent 




In recent years, Russia has increasingly evinced a strong preference 
for in-country care. As discussed, there are legitimate child-centered and 
political factors underlying this preference. The Russian government has 
indicated a desire to close orphanages, and increase the quality and 
                                                                                                                       
supra note 49, at 443 (pointing out the unfortunate emphasis in intercountry adoption literature on 
intercountry adoption over supporting birth families); Bainham, supra note 59, at 224 (arguing that 
the UNCRC and ECHR require countries to “use … best endeavors to reunite children with their 
families, to arrange substitute care where necessary and to stimulate the availability of [domestic] 
foster parents and domestic adopters.”). 
322 Smolin, Child Laundering, supra note 53, at 188. This relates to the proportionality of 
intercountry adoption as a child welfare outcome – see, generally, O’HALLORAN, supra note 34, at 
62. 
323 Supra, note 224, and accompanying text. 
324 Supra, note 225, and accompanying text. Cc. Dolgov, Letter to Senator Landrieu, supra 
note 179 ([UNCRC’s] provisions do not include any international legal obligations with regard to 
intercountry adoption of children..”). C.f. D’Amato, supra note 304, at 1243 (arguing that the 
UNCRC grants children the right to a family, which requires governments not to “block or impede 
adoption initiatives in the private sector”.  I would argue that, given the potential for corrupt 
practices to evolve in the absence of state regulation, there is no such duty of restraint). 
325 See, e.g., Fact Sheet No. 51 – Kafalah, International Social Service (Dec. 2007), available at 
http://www.iss-ssi.org/2009/assets/files/thematic-facts-sheet/eng/50.Kafala%20eng.pdf (noting that 
some Islamic schools prohibit international adoption as a matter of Shariah law; “The prohibition of 
adoption, as a means to create new filiation bonds, is based on an interpretation of two verses of Sura 
… of the Koran and is seen by Sharia law as a falsification of the natural order of society.”). 
326 Bainham, supra note 83, at 230.  
327 Bergquist, supra note 41, at 349 (internal citation omitted). 
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quantity of in-country family-based care. As the experience of Romania 
demonstrates,
328
 these are long-term objectives,
329
 which will take time. 
Changing the domestic adoption framework and culture such that the 
demand for families for these children can be met will also take time.
330
 
The problem with the Adoption Ban is that it cuts off a significant source 
of potential adoptive families for currently-institutionalized Russian 
children before sufficient suitable in-country alternatives have been made 
available.
331
 This subordinates the best interests of children currently 
waiting for families to political abstracts and ideals. 
It could be argued that the Adoption Ban thus conflicts with 
Russia’s international and domestic
332
 obligation to prioritize the best 
interests of children in all laws pertaining to their protection, including 
adoption laws.
 333
 That is, so the argument would go, while children 
without parental care do not necessarily have a right to be adopted 
internationally, Russia, as a participant in intercountry adoption, must 
make laws and decisions that prioritize the best interests of Russian 
children,
334
 and the Adoption Ban contravenes this obligation. However, 
such an argument is not well-founded, in light of international law’s 
express deference to states on the question of whether to partake in 
international adoption. Sara Dillon questions whether this deference 
continues to be valid, given our understanding of the psychology of 
institutionalization, and whether international law “adequately addresses 
the human rights needs of children”.
335
 She persuasively argues that the 
UNCRC should include, in a separate protocol, a clear statement against 
institutional living on human rights grounds.
336
 However, as it currently 
stands, international law remains “undefined on this critical point.”
337
 
                                                     
328 See, generally, Bainham, supra note 83, at 227-228 (discussing Romanian policies aimed at 
preventing institutionalization and stimulating domestic policy, and how, after some years, those 
policies had “begun to bear fruit”). 
329 See, also, Bartholet, Propriety, supra note 48, at 197 (“Solutions lie in reallocating social 
and economic resources both among countries and within countries, so that more children can be 
cared for by their birth families. But, given the fact that social reordering on a grand scale is not on 
the immediate horizon, international adoption clearly can serve the interests of at least those children 
in need of homes for whom adoptive parents can be found.”). 
330 Id.  
331 See, further, Triseliotis, supra note 66, at 131 (“To wait for improved social conditions 
before acting to give parents and countries a real choice (the choice of adopting) would be 
tantamount to sacrificing an existing generation of children who need families now.”). 
332 KONSTITUTUSIIA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [KONST. RF] [CONSTITUTION] (available at 
http://www.constitution.ru/en/10003000-03.htm).  art. 38(1) (“Maternity and childhood, and the 
family shall be protected by the State.”); Russian Family Code, supra note 127, art. 54(2) (“Every 
child shall have the right to live and to be brought up in a family insofar as possible.”); art. 124(1) 
(providing for adoption as a “priority form of placement of children who have remained without 
parental care”). 
333 Supra at notes 218, 220. 
334 UNCRC, supra note 69, art. 3(1); Declaration on Adoption, supra note 219, art. 5. 
335 Dillon, supra note 60, at 206, 208. 
336 Id. at 255. See, further, id. at 235-6 (comparing “the right not to be institutionalized with the 
right not to be tortured, not of course in the literal sense, but rather in that we can identify common 
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Nonetheless, the Adoption Ban is at least ethically, if not legally, 
problematic from the perspective of children presently in institutions 
who are unlikely to be moved to a family setting in the short-term. There 
are many times more Russian children eligible for adoption than there 
are prospective Russian adoptive families.
338
 Despite a move towards 
family/group-based settings,
339
 an estimated 100,000 designated orphans 
remain resident in non-family-based
340
 institutions. It is almost 
universally recognized that institutionalization in non-family-based 
settings is not in the best interests of children, and that family-based care 
best serves children’s physical, mental and emotional needs.
341
 In the 
long-term, the ban may also be detrimental for certain populations, such 
as children with special needs, who may never be “adoptable” 
domestically even in the long-run,
342
 A blanket rule prohibiting 
international placements (to America or generally) is too rigid to 
                                                                                                                       
negative effects on the human psyche – quite apart from cultural differences – which allow us to 
articulate an absolute prohibition on such treatment.”). 
337 Dillon, supra note 60, at 239 (“The fact that the existing law remains undefined on this 
critical point tends to transfer discretion to individual countries such that law-making is vulnerable to 
nationalistic political pressures, particularly in countries with larger numbers of “waiting” 
children.”). 
338 Top Court to Issue Adoption Guidelines ‘Within Weeks’, RIA NOVOSTI (Jan. 18, 2013), 
http://en.rian.ru/russia/20130118/178868227/Top-Court-to-Issue-Adoption-Guidelines-Within-
Weeks.html (citing Deputy Prime Minister Olga Golodets – 100,000 children eligible for adoption, 
but only 18,000 prospective domestic families). 
339 Supra at note (132), and accompanying text. 
340 Iusmen (supra note 272, at 6) rightly points out that “the stigma of ‘institutions’ as referring 
only to orphanages is misleading. Although orphanages with appalling conditions still exist, 
international institutions and child rights experts have been promoting the development of 
‘institutional care’ providing family-like environment”, which is to say that not all institutional care 
is the polar opposite of a family setting. See, further, Pini v Romania, supra note 271, at [153] (the 
ECtHR noting the “social and family environment” of a foster home in which two adopted 
Romanian girls has grown up, and where they wished to remain, rather than being adopted to Italy). 
341 See, e.g., Bartholet, Where do Black Children Belong?, supra note 48, at 1224; JOHNSON, 
supra note 56, at 151; Dillon, supra note 60, at 236-7. Further research is required on the suitability 
of family-type settings, such as group homes with parental-type care-givers; it is often assumed that 
permanent family adoption is uniformly preferable to foster/group home settings. In fact, this will 
depend on a variety of child-specific factors (see, e.g., Pini v Romania, supra note 271, a case 
concerning two Romanian girls who were adopted to Italy but expressed a desire to remain in the 
foster home in which they had grown up). It should also be noted that it appears that a significant 
number of Russian children adopted to the U.S. end up being cared for in group/foster-home 
settings, such as the Montana Ranch, which is widely regarded as an excellent provider of 
specialized care for adoptees with special mental health needs: see Kirk Johnson, Russian Adoptees 
Get a Respite on the Range, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Apr. 26, 2010). 
342 Thompson, supra note 180, at 707 (noting that Americans have adopted many disabled 
Russian children, whom “few Russians are willing to adopt”); Herszenhorn, supra note 212 (noting 
that a lawmaker from the United Russia party, which put forward the Adoption Ban, thought there 
should be an exception to the ban for children with disabilities); Aden, supra note 119 (noting the 
difficulty of finding adoptive parents for children with disabilities in Russia). 
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The ban is particularly problematic for Russian children who had 
already been matched with American parents. Russia requires 
international adoptive parents to travel to Russia and spend time with 
their prospective adoptive child once a match has been made, but prior to 
the final court order.
344
 Over three hundred Russian children who had 
met and bonded with their prospective American parents subsequently 
had their adoptions interrupted by the Adoption Ban.
345
 In addition to 
causing great personal hardship to both children and parents, and 
possibly violating the best interests principle in relation to those 
individual children, these interruptions arguably constitute a 
contravention of the ECHR right to family life,
346
 due to the parent-child 
bonding that has already taken place. The ECtHR has previously 
recognized that intended family life may be included in the scope of 
Article 8.
347
 A number of parents affected by the Adoption Ban are 




 3. Moving Forward, Dual Goals: In-country Care and Intercountry 
Adoption in the Interim  
Admittedly, it is sometimes the case that despite the short-term 
detriment to waiting children and families, moratoriums and bans on 
intercountry adoption are necessary to address systemic flaws in child 
protection and the adoption process.
349
  Such actions are never without 
                                                     
343 Molly Marx, Whose Best Interests Does it Really Serve? A Critical Examination of 
Romania’s Recent Self-Serving International Adoption Policies, 21 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 373, 408 
(2007); Carlson, supra note 94, at 258. 
344 Supra note 205.William Pierce notes that this requirement was “implemented because 
Russian officials were concerned about children in orphanages being “advertised” on internet 
websites” (William Pierce, Finding American Homes, Nat’l Rev. Online (Oct. 24, 2002), at 
http://old.nationalreview.com/comment/comment-pierce102402.asp). 
345 Supra note 205, and accompanying text. 
346 ECHR, supra note 267. 
347 Pini v Romania, supra note 271, at [143] (holding, in the case of international adoptive 
parents matched with Romanian adoptees,  that although “Article 8 presupposes the existence of a 
family…this does not mean, in the Court’s opinion, that all intended family life falls entirely outside 
the ambit of Article 8.” (emphasis added)). 
348 Ponomareva, supra note 215 (“The lawyers contend that familial relations between adoptive 
parents and a child arise when the latter begins to consider them as parents, not after a court 
decision.”). 
349 See, e.g., Sara Wallace, International Adoption: The Most Logical Solution to the Disparity 
Between the Numbers of Orphaned and Abandoned Children in Some Countries and Families and 
Individuals Wishing to Adopt in Others?, 20(3) ARIZONA J. OF INT’L AND COMP. L. 659, 715 (2003) 
(noting that in 1993, China suspended all international adoptions for ten months, to overhaul 
procedural requirements in light of concerns over black market adoptions and baby-selling); Maarten 
Pereboom, The European Union and International Adoption, CENTER FOR ADOPTION POLICY (Apr. 
28, 2005) (noting that in 2005, in response to EU concerns over child trafficking, Romania banned 
intercountry adoptions, aiming to “crack down on the corruption that existed in a highly flawed 
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controversy,
350
 but may in some cases be the most effective means of 
cleaning up an intercountry adoption system for the benefit of future 
participants. However Russia’s intercountry adoption system, especially 
in the wake of bilateral treaties with three major receiving countries, has 
a positive reputation.
351
 Given this, and given the availability of the 
Hague Convention and/or bilateral treaties to regulate and improve the 
intercountry adoption process, there is no long-term payoff or rationale 
for a premature ban on intercountry adoptions from Russia, much less an 
American-specific ban.  
Some opponents of intercountry adoption have argued that the 
practice discourages in-country initiatives aimed at reducing 
abandonment, and promoting adoption.
352
 Pavel Astakhov has argued 
that the Adoption Ban will force Russia to “take care of our orphans 
ourselves”, by “burning the bridge” to America.
353
 Other supporters of 
the ban have argued it will attract public attention to the issue of Russian 
orphans and increase domestic adoptions.
354
 Certainly, more research on 
the impact of intercountry adoption on domestic child welfare systems is 
needed. However, as Sara Dillon points out, “expressing commitment to 
investment in long-term solutions to the problem of abandonment has no 
logical corollary in disregarding the immediate matter of children 
presently in institutions.”
355
 In the long-term, Elizabeth Bartholet argues 
that it is “unlikely that adoption of a relatively small number of … 
homeless children will interfere with efforts to assist those other children 
who remain in their native countries.”
356
 On the contrary, “foreign 
adoption may “increase awareness in … receiving countries of the 
problems of children in the sending countries” and thus create a more 
sympathetic international climate.
357
 In contrast, in the wake of the 
Adoption Ban, Russia stands to incur widespread international criticism 
                                                                                                                       
system”.); Lisa Yemm, International Adoption and the “Best Interests” of the Child: Reality and 
Reactionism in Romania and Guatemala, 9 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 555, 571 (2010) 
(outlining the U.S.-imposed moratorium on adoptions from Guatemala due to non-compliance with 
the Hague Convention); Iusmen, supra note 272, at 8-9 (on the reasons behind Romania’s 
moratorium); Dillon, supra note 60, at 244-252 (discussing moratoriums on adoptions from 
Cambodia, Vietnam, Romania and Guatemala). 
350 See, e.g., Wechsler, supra note 59, at 3 (“[Romania’s] prohibition is not in the best interest 
of Romania’s many children living in institutions, but rather is a self-serving political policy enacted 
in an attempt to gain European Union membership.”); Marx, supra note 343. 
351 Supra, note 149, and accompanying text. 
352 Supra, note 84, and accompanying text. 
353 Aden, supra note 119.  
354 Russian Government Drafts Fresh Bill Facilitating Domestic Adoptions, RT (Feb. 26, 
2013), http://rt.com/politics/russian-government-drafts-fresh-bill-facilitating-domestic-adoptions-
459/. 
355 Dillon, supra note 60, at 196. 
356 Bartholet, Propriety, supra note 48, at 198 (referring to intercountry adoption globally). 
357 Id.  
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and condemnation for subordinating the immediate interests of her 
children to long-term and/or political objectives.
358
 
In light of the forgoing, Russia should be encouraged to reconsider 
the Adoption Ban, and to pursue the dual goals of (i) eradicating the need 
for intercountry adoption, and (ii) in the interim, allowing intercountry 
adoption (including to the U.S.) to continue, in accordance with the 
subsidiarity principle, where it can best serve the welfare needs of 
children without families. In relation to the former goal, Russia should 
pay particular attention to positive “upstream” measures aimed at 
keeping families together and pursuing reunification, within the best 
interests framework, in addition to existing initiatives aimed at 
improving in-country foster care and adoption prospects. Regarding the 
latter goal, the U.S. and Russia could engage in negotiations, within the 
bilateral treaty framework, on how to address Russian concerns with 
consular/state access to Russian children adopted in America, 
particularly in cases of alleged abuse or neglect. These actions are not 
inconsistent with a longer-term objective of reducing the need for 
intercountry adoption. More generally, Russia should consider ratifying 
the Hague Convention, or completing as a matter of priority bilateral 
adoption treaties with other countries that receive Russian adoptees, in 
order to better safeguard children and families.  
Intercountry adoption should continue to be a last-resort possibility 
wherever it serves the welfare needs of Russian children, for so long as 
the demand for families outstrips domestic supply. Of course, in 
encouraging Russia to reconsider the Adoption Ban, care must be taken 
to ensure that it is the interests of Russian children without parents, not 
American parents without children, that guide the discussion.
359
 It is also 
important that any assumptions about the suitability or otherwise of in-
country alternatives to intercountry adoption (such as family-style group 
homes and foster care) are based, as far as possible, on social science 
evidence
360
  and a case-by-case assessment of each child’s best 
                                                     
358 Catherine Bitzan, Our Most Precious Resource: How South Korea is Poised to Change the 
Landscape of International Adoption, 17 MINN. J. INT’L L. 121, 143 (2008) (arguing, in relation to 
South Korea’s adoption policies, that “acting preemptively [to ban intercountry adoption] may raise 
a host of new troubles for which the country may be even more widely criticized”). See, further, Will 
Englund & Tara Bahrampour, Russia’s Ban on U.S. Adoptions Devastates American Families, The 
Washington Post (Dec. 28, 2012, 10:00 AM) (“Senior members of the Russian cabinet had warned 
against the bill, saying that it … unavoidably draw[s] attention to the sorry state of Russian 
orphanages.”). For examples of criticism of the Adoption Ban, see supra at notes 212 and 213 
(Washington) and note 296 (Council of Europe and U.S. State Department). 
359 See Bainham, supra note 59, at 225 (asking, in relation to the Romanian moratorium on 
intercountry adoption, whether “the enthusiasm for restarting the practice [is] about meeting the 
needs of childless adults outside Romania, or … about providing for Romanian families and their 
children?”). 
360 See, generally, Dillon, supra note 60, at 192 (contending that only social science evidence 
can assist in determining to what extent the UNCRC is flawed due to its failure to clarify the 
standard of care that meets a human rights standard); and at 193-4 (noting that “the inquiry into 
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interests.
361
 As Russian authorities attempt to make such assessments, 
adoption to the U.S. should continue to be one of a range of options open 
to Russian children without families. 
 
CONCLUSION 
There is a Russian saying that “everyone sees the world from his own 
bell tower.”
362
 This Article has attempted to put forward the view from 
the Russian bell tower on intercountry adoption. It is not an attempt to 
apologize for the Russian ban on adoptions to American “forever 
families,” or to highlight the plight of Americans seeking to adopt from 
Russia.
363
 In the immediate context, with thousands of Russian children 
institutionalized, many of whom had already been matched, and bonded, 
with American parents, the ban subordinates the “best interests” principle 
to political considerations. The Adoption Ban represents a political 
reaction to a finger of blame (justifiably) pointed at Russia by the U.S., 
and is a reflection of the political nature of intercountry adoption 
generally. Beneath the “tit for tat” that the Adoption Ban embodies there 
may be genuine concerns about post-adoption care in America. These 
concerns inspired the Russian-American Adoption Agreement, which 
was heralded with great optimism on both sides. Although the agreement 
had not yet been fully rolled out, and although Russia apparently had 
continued concerns over post-adoption cooperation at the level of the 
U.S. states, these concerns could no doubt have been addressed with 
further negotiations and collaboration. 
Intercountry adoption is frequently presented as a self-evidently 
logical solution to the demand for children in receiving countries, and the 
ready supply of family-less children in sending countries.
364
 This is a 
short-sighted perspective, which understates the understandable desire of 
states to move towards caring for their children domestically, and the 
                                                                                                                       
whether an orphanage can provide an adequate form of protection for children in HR terms has little 
to do with the important, though separate, debate on cultural relativity and HR generally.”); at 236 
(noting the lack of empirical evidence as to what extent group family-style homes work as well as a 
family);  
361 See, e.g., Pini v Romania, supra note 271 (ECtHR noting the “social and family 
environment” of a foster home in which two adopted Romanian girls had grown up, and where they 
wished to remain). See, further, King, supra note 49 (arguing that intercountry adoption should be 
reformed to ensure children are not removed from “what they would describe as family”). 
362 Thomas Ware, The Other Side of the Hill, PARAMETERS 32, 32 (1977), 
http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/parameters/Articles/1977/ware.pdf. 
363 See, generally, Perry, supra note 111, at 106 (noting the over-emphasis in intercountry 
adoption literature on the perspective of would-be adoptive parents).  
364 See, e.g., Wallace, supra note 349, at 723 (“The practice of international adoption does 
appear to be a logical solution to this disparity in the number of orphaned and abandoned children in 
some countries and the number of families and individuals wishing to adopt in others.”); Marx, 
supra note 343, at 373 (“The obvious solution to this global problem is a convergence of supply and 
demand, creating families for children and children for families.”). 
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need to comply with child and parental rights by ensuring that wherever 
possible children remain with their birth parents.
365
 Russia’s aim of 
ultimately providing suitable in-country care for her children is a 
laudable one, with which receiving countries such as the U.S. can no 
doubt identify. As holders of parens patriae duties, states understandably 
are, and should be, concerned with providing, and being seen as able to 
provide, for the welfare of their most vulnerable populations. There is no 
obligation to partake in intercountry adoption per se. But an in-country 
welfare system will take time to develop, and a ban on adoptions to the 
U.S., historically a very significant receiver of Russian children, harms 
the best interests of children currently institutionalized who are unlikely 
to be moved to a family setting in the short-term. In the long-term, an 
intercountry adoption ban may also be problematic for certain 
populations, such as children with disabilities, who are less likely to be 
adopted or fostered domestically. A more appropriate and proportionate 
means of achieving in-country welfare, and ensuring that the subsidiarity 
principle and best interests principle are respected, is to vigorously 
reinvent the domestic welfare system, as Russia has shown signs of 
doing, but to retain intercountry adoption as a measure of last resort. 
Russia should be encouraged in its endeavors to improve in-country child 
welfare systems, and to consider reopening adoptions to America, at 
minimum as an interim, last resort option wherever it serves the best 
interests of the child in question.  
 
                                                     
365 C.f. Marx, supra note 343, at 376 (“Although the problems of children without families and 
families without children are distinct, one practice can solve them both: [international adoption].”). It 
is by no means a truism that “international adoptions are beneficial to all parties involved” (c.f. Marx 
at 380). 
